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PRIVATE STANDARDS, PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE: A NEW LOOK AT THE
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD
WI LL I A M W. BRAll'ON *
Abstract: The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB") pre-
sents a puzzle: Flow has this private standard setter managed simultane-
ously (1) to remain independent, (2) to achieve institutional stability and
legitimacy, and (3) to operate in a politicized context in the teeth of op-
position from its own constituents? This Article looks to governance de-
sign to account thr this institutional success. The FASB's thunders made a
strategic choice to create a regulatory agency that sought independence
rather than political responsiveness. The FASB also set out a coherent
theory of accounting, the "Conceptual Framework," to contain and direct
its decisions. The Conceptual Framework contributed to the FASB's insti-
tutional success by disavowing a neutral posture, explicitly privileging the
interests of the users of financial reports (investors and. market interme-
diaries) over the interests of the reports' preparers (large audit. firms and
their managers). Nonetheless, the FASB remains vulnerable to the allega-
tion that its complex, rules-based standards serve the audit firms' interest
in lowering the risk of liability while sacrificing the users' interest in
"fairly" stated financials. This Article endorses the rejoinder position.
What some see as capture also can be characterized as "responsiveness,"
and the FASB serves a public interest in taking seriously the accounting
firms' need for auditable standards. Although detailed rules can distort
the overall story told by a report's bottom line, they also make it easier to
see what preparers are doing, easing verification and making audit fail-
ures and scandals less likely. The FASB emerges as a generator of subop-
timal but institutionally defensible standards.
NTRODUCTI ON
Legal theory has long taught that a clear line divides neither pub-
lic from private law nor the public from the private sector. The legal
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Larry Cunning-
ham, Michael Froomkin, Don Langevoort, Frank Partnoy, and Sid Shapiro for their COM-
men ts on earlier drafts.
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realists showed that private law's most private precincts depend on
public coercive power and so are not private at all.' Public choice the-
ory made the converse showing—that public law may be viewed as a
product of private incentives. 2
 Recent "new governance" theory draws
from both of these views to question the tight conceptual connection
usually maintained among regulatory authority, hierarchical govern-
ment, and public accountability. 3
 it commends a more relaxed ap-
proach, both reminding us that private actors, properly incented and
deployed, can regulate successfutly, 4
 and asking us to think of govern-
ance as a cooperative undertaking among public and private actors
jointly confronting problems needing solutions. 5
Standard setting in particular can involve such public-private
regulatory cooperation. Government agencies often adopt privately
generated product standards and industrial codes to take advantage
of inexpensive, private expertise. 6
 But such arrangements can trigger
legitimate objections grounded in public values.? Standard setters are
accused of being secretive, industry dominated, and unrepresentative
of all interested parties. 8
All of these complaints and many more have been leveled at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB"), the private setter
of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") imposes on public
1
 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HAIM L. REV. 553, 589 (1933)
(contending that contract law, although viewed as "primte" in nature, performs essential
public functions, such as standardizing conduct); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution
in a Supposedly Non-Coercive Slate, 38 Pot,. tics. Q. 470, 470 (1923) (arguing that government
most inevitably interfere with economic Matters).
2 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 247-73 (1989) (describing government
output on the assumption that government actors are selfish utility maximizers).
5
 For overview.s of this "new governance" approach, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, New
Governance" in Legal Thought and in the Mild Some Splitting (1.1 Antidote to Overzealous Lump-
ing, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474-76 (20(14) (stressing experimentation and negotiation);
Orly Lobel, The Renew beak The Fall of Regulation and the. Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344-45, 405 (2004) (stressing reflexivity and soft law).
For an intervention from the "new" school concerning securities regulation, see Christie L.
Ford, Toward a New Model fur Securities Law Enforcement, 57 AoMIN, L. /Ow. 757, 819-28
(20(}5) (arguing that new governance "inflected" approaches can improve the inherited
deterrence-based securities law regime).
4 See JAN AYRES S.': JOIIN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGUIATION: TRANSCENDING. THE
DEREctut,xmoN DEBATE 54-56 (1992) (describing a tripartite regulatory enfOrcement strat-
egy that employs private interest groups as monitors)..
5
 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NN.U. L. REv. 543, 548 (2000).
' Id. at 640, 642,
7
 See id. at 641-42.
8
 See id.
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reporting companies. 9 The FASB presents itself as an independent, ex-
pert, and neutral body whose standards seek only to make transparent
the economic reality of reporting companies. Yet, since its founding in
1973, it has been repeatedly criticized for an excessively private colora-
tion, whether due to capture by managers and reporting firms or, al-
ternatively, by the large audit firms." Others allege the opposite, charg-
ing the FASB with insensitivity to private interests and excessive inde-
pendence." Some accuse the FASB of promulgating too many
standards, others not enough. 12 Some complain that GAAP reports
have become too complex due to overly specific, rule-based formula-
tions." Others complain that the standards provide insufficient guid-
ance. 14 For sonic the FASB is too slow and for others it changes things
too quickly."
The complaints are unsurprising. 16 When the FASB sets a new
standard, it intervenes in high-stakes territory. 17 Accounting rules im-
plicate the conflicting interests of the firms and managers who pre-
pare financial statements (the "preparers") and the investors and
9 The SEC is required to establish accounting requirements for public companies tinder
§ 19 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Stipp. III 2003). The agency de-
termined that it would rely on a private sector standard setter in 1938. See Administrative
Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No. 4, [1937-1982 Transler
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCU) 1 72,005, at 72,005 (Apr. 25, 1938). When the FASB
emerged in 1973, the SEC duly accorded it authoritative status as the generator of GAAP. See
Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles and
Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150.3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973). Following
a directive of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC restated its formal recognition or the FASB as
an authoritative standard setter in 2003. See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the
Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No,
8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003).
10 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING & Mc.srr., S. Comm. ON CrOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, STAFF REPORT: THE ACCOUNTING ESTABLISHMENT 1-2 (1970) [hereinafter 'DIE AC-
COUNTING Esmatast [MECO (alleging that the FASB dominates the Big Eight public account-
ing firms and their clients): Donald J. Kirk, Busineic and the PAS13: The Need for Effedive Interac-
tion, NiGMT. ACCT., Sept. 1978, at 17, 17 (noting that public sector regulators and agencies
have suggested that the FASB may not be capable or operating in the public interest).
11 See Dennis K. Beresford, How Should the FASB Be judged?, ACCT. HORIZONS, June
1995, at 56, 60.
IS See id.
IS Id.
14 Id.
Is Id.
16 See ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL. REPORTING: FASB AND
THE STRUGGLE FUR CONTROL. OF A CRITICAL PROCESS 10 (1994) (describing predictions
made at the FASB's inauguration).
17 See Mohamed Elmuttassim 'Hussein & J. Edward Katz, Accounting Standards-Setting in
the. U.S.: An Analysis of Power and Social Exchange, 10 J. Acc'r. &Pun. POI; Y 59, 71 (1991).
8
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other financial market actors who rely on the statements (the "us-
ers"). 18 A different accounting rule can lead to different resource al-
locations,ig as it impacts, inter alia, stock prices, investment decisions,
and executive compensation. 20 And despite the FASB's stated objec-
tive to reveal hard economic truth about preparer firms, no hard sci-
ence of financial reporting exists to import definitive justification to a
given standard. 21 Accounting standards are conventions 22 and finan-
cial truth is subject to interpretative shading. 23 The standard setter, no
matter how well informed, makes a judgment call."
The charges of capture seem plausible at first. Public accountants
fill three of the present FASB's seven seats and corporate executives
occupy two more. 25 With a live-to-two advantage, nothing prevents the
auditors and the corporate audit clients from acting concertedly when
their interests are aligned. 26 But the appearance of capture proves
deceiving. Neither the coalition hypothesized nor any remotely re-
sembling it has ever emerged on the FASB. 27 Observers have intensely
studied the FASB, but have failed to uncover signs of outside influ-
ence. 28 Although capture has been attempted, the FASB has retained
its independence, steadily strengthening its institutional position over
time.° As it has done so, however, it has not silenced its critics."
There emerges a puzzle for those interested in the design of pri-
vate governance institutions: How can a private standard setter simul-
taneously maintain its independence and achieve institutional stability
while operating in a politicized context, in the teeth of opposition
from its own constituents?
18 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at. 5-4.
19 See Hussein & Kati, supra note 17, at 71.
20 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 1-2.
21 See Bereslord, supra note 11, at 61.
22 Id. at 57.
23 VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 1-2.
2 ' 1 See Bereslord, supra note l i, at 57.
25 See Dm; n R. HER wrrz & MATTI itiw J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING Volt LAWYERS: MATE-
RIALS 154 (3d ed. 2002).
26 See id. at 154, 156.
27 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 60.
28 see
29 See Ronald King & Gregory Waymire, Accounting Standaal-Setting Institutions and the
Governance of Incomplete Contracts, 9 j, ACCT. AuorriNG & FIN. 579, 586 (1994); George
Mundstock, The Trouble with PASB, 28 N.C. p. INT'L L. & Cont. REG. 813, 817 (2003).
3° See Bereslord, supra note 11, at 60-61.
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This Article looks to "old" governance design concepts to ac-
count for this private agency's institutional success. 31 The FASB's
founders made a strategic choice between the two leading models of a
public regulatory agency: the classical New Deal model of an inde-
pendent expert and the post-war pluralist model of a politically re-
sponsive regulator. They took the New Deal route, structuring the
FASB to emphasize independence. Because the New Deal model calls
for a normative goal to channel the agency's exercise of chscretion, 32
the FASB undertook to set out a coherent theory of accounting, the
"Conceptual Framework," to contain and direct its decisions and
thereby to import legitimacy. 33 It did not achieve the stated goal, how-
ever: the Conceptual Framework neither determined nor, justified the
FASB's subsequent decisions." As a result, the FASB never realized
the ideal in which agency legitimacy follows ineluctably from the
combination of independence and expertise. 35 But the Conceptual
Framework nonetheless contributed to the FASB's institutional suc-
cess by disavowing a neutral posture towards its constituents' conflict-
ing interests and explicitly privileging the user interest over the pre-
parer interest. 36 The FASB has consistently adhered to this repudiation
of pluralist responsiveness, whatever its public professions of neutral-
ity. Three results have followed. First, the FASB's general approach
has been defensible as a matter of economic theory. Second, the
FASB has faced political opposition from the preparers. 37 Although
this led to occasional political reversals, it also muted allegations of
capture. Third, the preference for users aligned the FASB's institu-
tional mission with that of the SEC, its public overseer, importing in-
stitutional stability if not political invulnerability. 38 If not ideally le-
gitimate, the FASB has been legitimate enough.
31 For an important discussion of points of friction arising from the FASB's fulfillment
of a public function as a private organization, see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Private Standards in Public. Law: Copyright, Lawmaking, and the Case of Accounting-, 104 Mical.
L. REV. 291 (2005).
32 ,SerjAMES M. LANDIS, THE:ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 39,50-51 (1938).
33 See Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, Accr. HORIZONS, Nlan
2003, at 61,62-63.
34 See M undstock, supra note 29, at 830-39.
35 See BereslOrd, supra note 11, at 60-61.
35 See OBJECTIVES OF FIN. REPORTING. BY Bus. ENTER., Statement of Fin. Accounting
Concepts No, I, § 34 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978) [hereinafter FASB, SFAC No. I),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/conl.pdf.
37 See VAN RIPER, .supra note 16, at 75-76,118-22.
" See id. at 141.
10
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The FASB remains vulnerable to a secondary capture allegation.
Critics charge that its complex, rules-based standards serve the audit
firms' interest in lowering the risk of liability while sacrificing the us-
ers' interest in "fairly" stated financials." They contend that "princi-
ples-based" standards would be better.° The critics have a point. But
this Article endorses the rejoinder position. What some see as capture
also can be characterized as "responsiveness." The FASB serves a pub-
lic interest in taking seriously the accounting firms' need for audit-
able standards. Even as detailed rules can distort the overall story told
by a report's bottom line, they make it easier to see what preparers are
doing, easing verification and making audit failures and scandals less
likely. In this post-Enron era, scandal prevention arguably takes a le-
gitimate place with transparency as a public-regarding goal for the
GAAP setter.
The FASB emerges as a generator of suboptimal but institution-
ally defensible standards. Part 1 describes the FASB's founding and
subsequent history as an effort to stay legitimate while simultaneously
maintaining independence and avoiding pluralist subordination to
constituent in tereStS. 41
 As means to these ends, the FASB's organizers
have drawn liberally on "public" devices in the tool box of administra-
tive process. This ongoing process, which recently climaxed with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"), 42
 has over time embedded the
FASB in the regulatory framework of American business. Part 11 shows
the connection between the FASB's adherence to the New Deal model
of the independent, expert agency and the Conceptual Framework's
declaration of a goal, "decision usefulness," favoring the user over the
preparer interest." Part 111 turns to the standards themselves, taking
up the rules-versus-principles debate and the subsidiary capture ques-
tion."
1. FORMATION, PROCESS, AND STRUCTURE
This Part explains the FASB's founding and organization as an
exercise in agency design under the classical expertise model. 45
 The
" See The Lessoto from Enron, EcoNomtsr, Feb. 9,2002, at 9,9- 10.
ID Id.
" See infra notes 45-212 and accompanying text..
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,11 6 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections or t I, 15, 18,28, and 29 U.S.C.).
45 See infra notes 213-318 and accompanying text.
41
 Set' infra notes 319-442 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 49-212 and accompanying text.
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model teaches that it does not suffice to delegate standard-setting au-
thority to competent experts and then leave oversight to the legisla-
tive principal and the public. The resulting zone of discretion under
such circumstances will be unsatisfactorily wide, particularly if any
question arises respecting the standard setter's independence. Such
was the problem with accounting standard setters that preceded the
FASB. The FASB's founders accordingly attempted to separate the
standard setter from the preparers, the users, and the accounting pro-
fession. According to the classical theory, however, such a separation
still will not suffice to import legitimacy. The independent agent's ex-
pertise will contain its discretion only if the agency pursues an ascer-
tainable goal. The original FASB sought to put itself inside the model
by articulating a Conceptual Framework for accounting.
Many found the design intrinsically infirm, however. From a pub-
lic choice point of view, independence and expertise prevent neither
empire building by the agency nor capture by the regulated interest.
From a public interest point of view, the classical model leads to in-.
sensitivity to public demands and so cannot legitimately be employed
with private actors. The FASB, sticking to the classical playbook, sur-
vived attacks from both points of view. But it also reformed itself over
time, taking on more and more of the procedural earmarks of a pub-
lic institution. Section A describes the FASB's founding and design. 4 6
Section B describes the criticisms leveled against it. 47 Section C de-
scribes its subsequent organizational evolution."
A. Foundation and Design
1. Antecedents and Founding
Institutionalized standard setting came to accounting in the wake
of the enactment of the federal securities laws," which directed the
SEC to prescribe the Form and content of financial statements. 50 The
SEC went back and forth on what to do about the matter for several
4fi See infra notes 49-130 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 131-164 and accompanying text.
48 See infia notes 165-208 and accompanying text,
49 Previous initiatives had been small scale and applied only to selected industries, and
so left conflicts unresolved. Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 72: see also FED. RESERVE Bu.,
UNIFORM ACCOUNTING 5 (1917).
5° See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22,48 Slat. 74. For a review of the
legislative history, see Sean M. O'Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: limo Accountants
and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741,798-820 (2004).
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years, 51
 finally determining in 1938 to delegate the job of providing
"substantial authoritative support" Ibr accounting treatments to the
accountants' professional organization, the American Institute of Ac-
countants (the "AlA") (later the American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants (the "AICPA")). 52
 The AlA responded in haste, creat-
ing the Committee on Accounting Procedure (the "CAP"). 53 This
committee was made up of twenty-one part-time, geographically dis-
persed members, most of whom were certified public accountants
("CPAs"). 54
 The committee also included a few academics, 55
 as well as
a two-member staff. 56
 The AIA assigned the CAP a limited mission: to
recommend acceptable standards by drawing from the wider menu of
prevailing practices, rather than to set new standards. 57 Preparers
were not compelled to adopt them and the CAP was flexible about
available alternatives. 58
 The CAP's constituents, however, disliked this
ad hoc approach, demanding more uniformity and specificity. 59
In 1959 the AICPA dissolved the CAP and substituted a new
committee, the Accounting Principles Board (the "APB"), which sur-
vived until 1973. 60
 The APB's twenty-one part-time.members included
preparers and users in addition to CPAs and academics. 61 It also had a
research staff. 62
 But the APB satisfied neither the preparers nor the
audit profession. 63
 Those were Wall Street's "go-go" years, and the
flow of new accounting issues outstripped the APB's capacity. 64 Reve-
nue recognition problems, off-balance-sheet leases, and the new in-
vestment tax credit all triggered controversy. 65
 Worse, the APB was
5/ See ROBERT ClIATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL. REPORTING: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CON-
TROL% 111-32 (1975).
52 See Stephen A. Zell, A Perspective on the U.S. PUblie/Private -Sector Apppach to the Regula-
tion of-Financial Reporting, Accr. HoutzoNs, Mar, 1995, at 52,55.
53 See VAN RIPER, Su/MI nine 111, at 7. For a history of the CAP, see CIIATOV, supra note
51, at 133-52.
SI
	 supra note 52, at 55-56. Note that Chaim,
 states that there were eighteen mem-
bers on the committee. Cutxrov, supra note 51, at 196.
55 'Leff, ,supra note 52, al 55-56.
56 CIIATOV, supra note 51, at 134.
57 VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 7.
58 CIIATOV, supra note 51, at 134; King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 584.
59 VAN lit l'ER, supra note 16, at 7; King & Waymire, .supra note 29, al 582-83.
66 For a history, see 01,m:iv, supra note 51, at 195-233.
6/ Zell, supra note 52, at 56.
62 CHAIM', supra note 51, at 196.
65 See id, at 197-99; VAN RIPER, supra note 16, BA 8.
" See VAN Ri PER, supra note 16, at 7.
65
 Id. at 57-59.
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seen as dominated by large accounting firms. 66 To some, this implied
preparer capture, as the CPAs yielded to pressures from their cli-
ents. 67 But the preparers did not get all the treatments they wanted; in
fact, they complained of underrepresentation. 68 The APB also was
charged with developing a fundamental accounting theory—a con-
ceptual framework to guide its standard setting.° But it made little
progress there as well." Indeed, the project came to an end when its
staff produced its First Accounting Research Study recommending
radical departures from cost accounting. 71 The APB itself rejected the
initiative. 72 In the end, the APB's failure to promulgate a timely stan-
dard to govern mergers exhausted the patience of the large accounting
firms."
In 1971, the AICPA convened a conference of auditors, prepar-
ers, and users that appointed two study groups to consider what to do
next." A follow-up conference considered and endorsed the study
groups' recommendation that the standard setter remain private, so
as best to draw on private sector expertise and avoid susceptibility to
political pressure." But, on this third try, the conference participants
decided that the standard setter's structure should not only guarantee
independence, but also assure better constituent representation."
Thus did the FASB emerge in 1973 out of a series of private negotia-
tions among representatives of its various constituents." The SEC
quickly accorded it authoritative status."
2. Design
Independence meant formal separation from constituent groups,
so the primary structural change occurred at the top." The standard
setter was pulled from the AICPA and reorganized under the Financial
66 Hussein & Katz, .supra note 17, at 73.
57 See id.
68 VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 8.
s!+
	 id. at 7.
7° See id.
71 See King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 583.
72 Id.
" Id.
74 ht
75 VA N RIPER, SUPICE note 16, at 9.
76 Id.
77 See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 76.
78 See Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Prin-
ciples and Standards, supra note 9.
79 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 9.
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Accounting Foundation (the "FAF"), an independent not-for-profit en-
tity. 8° The FAF's nine trustees were to come from five sponsoring or-
ganizations, representing CPAs, preparers, users, and academics, 81
 But
the accounting profession did not cede a position of primary influ-
ence—the AICPA had a majority of five seals. 82 The FAF's (and thus the
FASB's) funding came from contributions from the participating pro-
fessional organizations, the large accounting firms, and preparers."
A board comprised of seven full-time members appointed by the
FAF trustees replaced the part-time, dispersed, and dysfunctional APR
board of twenty-one." This new structure enabled the board to act
more quickly. The seven members were to sever their connections
with their employers, divest their investments, and go on salary for
five-year terms (with possible reappointment). 85
 Four of the seven
members were required to be CPAs; the others were to be "well versed
in problems of financial reporting."88
 Voting was to proceed on a five-
to-two supermajority basis. 87 Rules of Procedure, ever since referred
to as the FASB's "due process," were to be adopted and followed. 88
Independence also meant distance from constituents and politicians,
so Connecticut was chosen as the venue over New York or Washing-
ton. 89
 Finally, for the founders, independence also implied secrecy."
The original FASB met in private prior to the publication of a new
standard's Exposure Draft. 91
 Member dissents were not published. 92
Constituent responsiveness was addressed, if not assured, through
the establishment of an advisory body, the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Advisory Council (the "FASAC"), appointed by the FAF and
8° See id.
81
 Id. at 14. The sponsoring organizations were the AICPA, the American Accutiming
Association (educators), the Financial Analysts Federation (now the Association for In-
vestment Management and Research), the Financial Executives Institute, and the National
Association of Accountants. Id. The Securities Industry Association joined a few years bier.
ht.
" Id. Three of the remaining seats were to come from the preparers and users; one
was to be an academic. CUATOV, supra note 51, at 5.
83 See Nanette ['agouti & Ray G. Stephens, A Guide to Standard Setting Bodies, Onto CPA
J., Aug. 1995, at 44, 44.
sr ,5#,e Clixrov, supra note 51, at 233: `Leff, supra note 52, at 56.
85 VAN R] PER, AUPM note 16, at 17.
Ci IAT1W, 3101Y1 note 51, at 5.
87
 VAN RIPER, 800W note 16. at 87.
148 Id. at 18.
N) Id. at 13.
90 See id. at 18.
91 M.
92 King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 5811,
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overseen by the chair of the FASB." The FASAC would contain
twenty-seven members representative of the constituent groups and
possessing skills valuable to the FASB;" the SEC's Chief Accountant
also was to be a member. 95 It was to consult with the FASB on policy
issues and technical matters, so as to help it prioritize, set agenda
items, and keep things moving. 96 Although it has always been rele-
gated to an advisory role, the FASAC has fulfilled these duties and
never hesitated to criticize the Board.°
The FASB's founders, then, wanted the new standard setter to be
independent yet responsive to constituent interests." In addition,
they wanted the FASB to remain insulated from political pressure."
But they left one problem unresolved. As they saw it, the new agency
had no substantive mandate on which to draw in drafting stan-
dards.'" The constituents needed to conic to a basic agreement, if
not on the terms of particular standards, then at a more general level
on the substantive mission of the enterprise.m The founders left this
constitutional task to the agency itself. 102 The early FASB responded
with the Conceptual Framework, a series of statements intended to
provide a unified theoretical basis from which to articulate standards,
stressing financial statement reliability, comparability, and relevance
to users. 103
93 See VAN RIPER. supra note 16, at 17.
94 Id. In 1975, the FASAC was comprised of six members from large audit firms, five
from corporations, eight front the financial sector, three academics, two lawyers, two from
government, and a former SEC chief accountant. CHATov, supra note 51, at 5.
95 CHATOV, supra note 51, at 5.
96 Id. at 234.
97 VAN RIPER, supra note l6, at 17; Ilagood & Stephens, supra note 83, at 44: King &
Waymire, supra note 29, at 597.
98 See Cu(Attn., supra note 51, at 2.3'2-59; VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 9, 17.
99 VAN RIPER, Supra note Ili, at 9.
00 See Kirk, supra note 10, at 18.
101 see id.
102 See id.
105 The FASB's original deliberations led to six statements. See generally armENTs (II'
FIN. STATEMENTS—A REPLACEMENT OF FASB CONCEPTS STATEMENT No. 3 (INCORPORAT-
ING AN AMENDMENT OF FASB CONCEITS STATEMENT No. 2), Statement of Fin. Accounting
Concepts No. 6 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985), available at lutp://ww•.fasb.org/
pdf/con6.pdf; RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT IN FIN. STATEMENTS OF lies. ENTERS.,
Statement of Fin, Accounting Concepts No. 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1984), avail-
able at http://wwsv.fasb.org/pdf/con5.pdf;  OBJEcTivEs or FIN. REPORTING RV NONBUSI-
NESS ORGS., Statement. of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Rd.
1980), available at Illtp://WWw.faSh.Org/pdf/C0114.pa  ELEMENTS OF FIN. STATEMENTS OF
Bus. ENTERS., Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 3 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1980), available at Intp://csww.fasb.org/pdf/con3.pol;  QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS
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3. The FASB and Agency Theory
The structural succession of the CAP to the APB to the FASB re-
flects the twentieth-century evolution of thinking about administrative
agency design. Originally; agency discretion was not seen as problem-
atic.'" In Richard Stewart's phrase, agencies were conceived as "trans-
mission belts" that implemented legislative directives. 1°5 All one needed
was an expert acting within his or her zone of competence and appro-
priate results would follow, with legislative oversight, bureaucratic struc-
ture, and popular opinion sufficing to assure compliance with legisla-
tive directives. 14)6 For instance, both the CAP and the APB operated on
the assumption that standard-setting problems could be addressed
adequately simply by applying professional expertise. 1 °7
But more was needed to justify the delegation of rule-making dis-
cretion to agencies. Thus did the New Dealers restate the theory of
the administrative agency to stress the interplay between the legisla-
tive mandate and the agency's expertise. 108
 If the agency's goal was
stated explicitly, the regulator's expertise solved the discretion prob-
kno09 Agency rule making became a trial and error process of apply-
ing neutral, expert knowledge to realize the stated goal. 110 The rules
emerged as a function of the expertise and the state of the world,
supported by objective bases. 11 Thus generated, they could not be
arbitrary. With the Conceptual Framework project inherited from the
APB, the FASB drew on this approach, seeking to justify its independ-
ent exercise of discretion by articulating generally accepted goals that
would determine specific accounting standards. 112
OF ACCOUNTING INFO., Statentent Or Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 2 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1980) [hereinafter FASB, SFAC No. 2J, available at http://www.fasb.org/
ptl1'/con2pdf; FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra lime 36. The FASB also issued one later statement.
USING GAS11 FLow 1NFo. Asm PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS, Statement
of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 7 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) thereinafter
FASB, SFAC No. 7], available at http://www.fitsb.org/pdflcon7.pdf.
104 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Haim L.
REV. 1667,1675 (1975).
to Id.
IN See id.
I 07
 See supra notes 49-73 and accompanying text.
I" See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1672-73,1678.
109 See LAND' s, so pra note 32, at 50-51,98-99.
II" See id.; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1678.
111 See LANDIS, supra note 32, at 98-99; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1678.
112 See King & Waymire, .supra note 29, at 585-86.
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The post-war critique of the New Deal expertise model also influ-
enced the structure of the FASB." 3 Practical experience led to ques-
tions about the agency experts' independence.'" Critics charged that
the experts unduly favored the interests of regulated parties—the
same allegation of capture that had impaired the APB's credibility. 115
The FASB's founders sought to cure this problem through formal
separation from the accounting profession." 6 The FASB's due process
regime similarly mirrored the standard public law palliative for cap-
ture problems—containment of agency discretion through process
rules. 117 Agencies also had come to be seen as prone toward overregu-
lation, ever more elaborating their systems of controls. 118 The FASB
therefore established a built-in advisory hoard that was assigned the
job of overseeing its agenda. 119
The FASB's founders drew the line when it came to a more fun-
damental objection to agency authority. The expertise model only
works if there is a general consensus on the stated goal. 12° Its critics
destabilized that assumption by questioning the very existence of an
objective public interest available to channel and contain agency dis-
cretion. 121 Under this pluralist view, agency rule making becomes a
legislative and political process of balancing conflicting constituent
interests in light of a legislative directive. 122 It follows that legitimacy
under this view depends on the agency's political responsiveness—the
governance structure must afford interest groups a forum and assure
consideration of their views.'" And the more responsive the agency,
the less serious the capture problem. 124 Agency design becomes a mat-
ter of mediating tensions under this view because the pluralist ap-
proach, carried to its logical conclusion, negates the independence
Lit See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1684.
114 Id. at 1682.
115 See VAN RIPER, .supra note 16, at 8; Stewart, supra note 104, at 1684.
116 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 14.
117 See. Stewart, supra note 104, at 1698-90.
118 See id. at 1685.
110 See CHATOV, .supra note 51, at 234. The FASB did not inherit a third agency prob-
lem, limited resources, which could lead to an excessive reliance on the resources of regu-
lated interests. See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1686. Rather, the FASB owed its existence to
the SEC's decision not to devote its own resources to setting accounting standards. See
Administrative Policy on Financial Statentenis, supra note 9, at 72,005.
120 Stewart, supra note 104, at 1702; see ',Argots, supra note 32, at 50-51.
121 See Stewart, supra note 104, at 1683.
122 Id,
123 Freeman, .supra note 5, at 559-60.
'24 Id. at 560.
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model. 125 The agency, albeit expert, merely functions as an aggregator
of outside preferences. 126 This makes private standard setting particu-
larly problematic, for such a political process arguably should be con-
ducted in the public sector. 127
If the FASB's founders perceived this problem they did not admit
it, because admission would have implied the abandonment of the
enterprise and the remission of the standard-setting function to the
SEC. The FASB's existence stemmed from its private constituents' de-
sire to avoid the political and financial risks attending such a surren-
der of control. 128 So averse were they to a public outcome that they
proved willing not only to vest agenda control in a nominally inde-
pendent hoard, but also to pay for its expenses.
The FASB's founders, then, implicitly denied the pertinence of
the pluralist critique, instead insisting on the New Deal expertise
model's suitability and designing a hoard that would be responsive as
a matter of process. The FASB founders felt no duty to balance con-
stituent demands, which made the Conceptual Framework project's
successful completion all the more important. With the Framework
up and running in a context of general consensus, the FASB would
perfectly embody the expertise model. 129 It would be a legitimate neu-
tral actor rather than a political actor in an interest group game.'"
Things would not work out as projected, however.
B. Public and Private 	 roaches
The FASB, charged with making the New Deal model work in a
private standard-setting context, undertook its task at an unpropitious
time. 131 The Wall Street "go-go" years ended abruptly in 1973,  and
were followed by a spate of scandals. 132 Shortcomings in accounting
standards received some of the blame for these scandals, which put
accounting on the Congressional reform agenda. 133 At the same time,
the New Deal agency model was being intensely criticized from oppo-
125 Id.
126 hi.
127 See id.
128 See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
129 See LANDIS, septa note 32, at 50-51; Mtandstock, supra note 29, at 818.
13° See Mundstock, supra note 29, at 818,
131 See VAN RIPER, .supra note 16, at 7.
132 Id. at 7-8.
133 Beresford, supra note II, at 58.
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site sides in public policy debates. 134 Progressives wanted more public
responsiveness, while public choice commentators dismissed the whole
agency project as a means to the end of private rent seeking. IS The
FASB faced both attacks as it went forward under the banners of rele-
vance, reliability, and informational neutrality. 136
I. Public Interest
The founders' project of cabining the FASB in the New Deal
Model did not lack irony. In the eyes of progressive critics, the whole
enterprise resulted from a typical agency malfunction by a leading
exemplar of the New Deal legacy—the SEC.'" The critics made a
powerful case. It was clear to everybody that choices of accounting
principles had significant allocative consequences, whatever the ac-
counting profession's position as to whether GAAP followed from ob-
jective determinants and led to objective truths. 138 Neutral and trans-
parent accounting principles did not exist. 139 A political characteriza-
tion of the enterprise followed: accounting standard setting was a
high-stakes game in which the setter had no alternative but to balance
interests. 140 And, to the extent the standard setter resolved political
rather than technical issues, 141 its legitimacy depended on political
responsiveness. 142 It followed that independence was not a virtue, but
a guarantee of irrelevance, isolation, and unaccountability. 143 The
public interest was at stake and a responsible public body had never
even made a considered decision on the matter. 144 The time had
come to vest standard-setting authority in an agency directly responsi-
ble to Congress. 145
Nor, in any event, could the FASB be considered independent.'"
It depended on contributions from the preparers and auditors,
134 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 18-19.
"8 See Beresiord, supra note 11, at 58,60; Kirk, supra note 10, at 17.
135 See. Beresford, supra note 11, at 58; Kirk, supra note 10, at 1 7.
137 CUATOV, .supra Hole 51, at 8.
"8 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 22-23.
1S2 Mundstock, supra note 29, at 822.
140 IAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 73-74.
141 Matters of measurement were considered to he technical issues, whereas the ulti-
mate determination or the treatment was seen as a political matter. Id.
142 Id. at 22-23.
143 Mundstock, supra note 29, at 820.
144 CHATOV, supra note 51, at 7.
143 See id. at 7-8.
146 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 14.
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groups with high stakes in all of its outcomes. 147 A government board
would do a better job of weighing the costs and benefits.'"
This public interest position got a public airing in Congress in
1976 when Senator Lee Metcalf's Committee on Government Opera-
tions held hearings and issued a blistering report)" The SEC, the
Committee said, had delegated the standard-setting function to special
interest groups, in particular the Big Eight accounting firms, which en-
joyed disproportionate representation on the FAF and the FASB in ad-
dition to controlling funding and staffing. 150 To restore public
confidence, the General Accounting Office needed to take over the
function, the SEC having disqualified itself in the matter) 51 Actors from
the FAF and the FASB made their first trip to Washington to defend
themselves at subsequent hearings. 152 Happily, things quieted down by
the time a bill finally reached the House floor.'" The bill, which never
reached a vote, would only have required the SEC to set the FASB's
agenda, impose a timetable, and intervene with its own standards if the
FASB were slow or issued unsatisfactory standards. 154
2. Public Choice
Public choice theory explains the behavior of public actors in
terms of private incentives. 155 Agencies become the targets of rent-
seeking interest groups, the agencies themselves constituting just an-
other interest group.' 5fi Thus depicted, the agencies serve the de-
mands of the groups while expanding their own operations and power
bases. 157 During the FASB's early years, public choice theorists applied
their considerable critical acumen to a new description of the evolu-
tion of accounting standards. 158
117 See id.
Hit See Be resford, supra note II, at 60.
149 See generally THE ACCOUNTING FsrA 111.1SHNIENT, supra note
1511 See id. at 1-2.
151 VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 45.
152 SeeKi•k, supra note 10, at 18.
153 See VAN RIPER, .supra note 1 li , al 45.
154 See Kirk, sup, note 10, al 18,
155 See Freeman, .supra note 5, at 561-62.
156 See id,
157 See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, 63 Ac•t . .
REX'. 1, 11 (1988).
156 See. Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Accounting
Theories: The Madre for Excuses, 54 Ater. REV. 273, 277 (1979).
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The public choice theorists' description follows from a picture of
an unregulated economy in which managers have high-powered repu-
tational incentives to disclose Financial information voluntarily) 59
Given those incentives, accounting practice evolves so as to reduce
agency costs if left unregulated.m Reporting practices vary with the
context, depending on capital structure, monitoring costs, size, dis-
persion, and complexity)" In contrast, in a regulated economy, indi-
viduals compete to use the government's coercive power to transfer
wealth to themselves, arguing that the transfer is in the public interest
to justify the results) 62 Mandated accounting treatments serve just
this purpose, as vested interests compete over them using neutrally
phrased terms.'63
Under this public choice reading, the standard-setting enterprise
is intrinsically infirm so long as the standards are mandated. If there
are mandated standards, very little difference lies in the choice be-
tween a public and private agency—the FASB and the SEC both arc
seen as bad entities because they operate a mandatory disclosure sys-
tem. The solution lies in the mandate's removal. At that point a pri-
vate standard setter need not be a bad thing, for its existence and ro-
bustness would depend on free choices made by preparers and users.
Although this view has negative implications for the legitimacy of
the FASB, the political implications are marginal)" The capture alle-
gation made by the FASI3's progressive critics is echoed, but not repli-
cated, by public choice theorists. Here, capture implies wholesale de-
regulation with a consequent sacrifice of uniformity, not to mention
total reliance on market correctives to align prepare!. incentives. The
169 See id. at 275.
160 M. at 277.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 280-81.
161 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 158, at 280-81: see also Ross L. Watts & Jerold L.
Zimmerman, Towatrls a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards, 53 Acct . .
REv. 112, 118 (1978) (predicting that managers of large firms will seek accounting princi-
ples that understate returns in order to hide income from regulators, while small firms
that arc lOcused on incentive pay will do the opposite).
164 For a similarly marginal line of attack from the private side or the public/private di-
vide, see generally Oracc Johnson, Some Implications of the United Slates Constitution Jim Ac-
counting Institution Alternativec, 19 J. Acc .r. RES. (Su et'.) 89 (1981) (arguing that Financial
reports are constitutionally protected speech). For trenchant comments, see generally
Roberta S. Karmel, Discussion of Some Implications of the United States Constitution for Account-
ing Institution Alternatives, 19 J. ACCT. Ras. (Suet'.) 120 (1981), and Edmund W. Kitch, Dis-
cussion of Some Implications of the United States Constitution for Accounting Institution Alterna-
tives, 19 J. ACCT. Res. (Suet'.) 123 (1981).
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FASB has faced more immediate problems in making its case for le-
gitimacy.
C. Institutional Evolution
The FASB and the FAF have been tinkering with their process
and structure ever since the Metcalf Report slapped clown the charge
of capture and posed a pluralist alternative. 165
 The changes have al-
most uniformly pushed the FASB in the direction of greater public
responsiveness. 166
1. Structural Modifications
The process started with a FAF review in the immediate wake of
the Metcalf intervention. 167 The review led to measures that further
separated the FASB from the large audit firms. Contributions from
any single firm were capped at $50,000 or one percent of the FASB
budget. 166
 The requirement that four of the seven board members be
CPAs also was eliminated in favor of a weaker requirement that mem-
bers have knowledge of accounting, finance, and business. 169 The su-
permajority voting requirement was replaced as a result.'" The five-
to-two rule followed from a desire to prevent the appearance of a
dominant CPA voting coalition. 171
 With the removal of the CPA ma-
jority, a simple majority rule sufficed. 172
 In addition, the AICPA lost its
veto over the selection of FAF trustees.'" Sole nominating power was
instead vested in a committee of representatives from the FAF's spon-
soring organizations. 174
 The FASAC received an independent chair
and an expanded role. 175
 Finally, sunshine replaced secrecy, as pro-
ceedings were opened and dissents and other records made public.'"
Future plans were to be published in periodic reports.'"
165 SeeTIIE ACCOUNTING ESTARLISUNIENT, 5upra note 10, at 1-2, 20-24; infrer notes 167-
197 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 167-197 and accompanying text.
167
 VAN RIPER, tn/ira note 16, at 46.
163
 hi. at 88.
169 Id. at 86-87,
17° id. at 87.
171 Id .
172
 VAN RIPER, sl/pra note 16, at 87.
173 See Kirk, .strpra note 10, al 19.
174
 VAN RIPER, Minn note 16, at 86.
176 M. at 47, 87,
176
 Id. at 86.
177 Id. at 46.47.
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Thereafter, the FASB became a larger organization, mostly
funded by the proceeds of its own publications. 178 More staff en-
hanced its ability to meet constant demands for "timely guidance"
with technical bulletins. 179 In 1984, it formed a subsidiary organiza-
tion to address interpretive questions arising under existing rules. 180
This Emerging Issues Task Force has fifteen seats, ten of which are
filled by partners from accounting firms. 181 Preparer representatives
take three seats, and, significantly, three votes suffice to block a de-
termination and force the matter to the FASB's agenda. 182
Preparer demands rose to the fore in the 1980s. 188 They wanted
better representation on the FASB itself and got it in 1985. 184 From
then on, the FASB would be comprised of three CPAs, two representa-
tives from preparers, one user representative, and an academic.'"
That same year, the AICPA ceded its ex officio trustee seat on the FAF
to a preparer representative. 188 In 1990, preparer complaints about
standards overload led to the reimposition of the five-to-two superma-
jority rtile. 187
The AICPA thereafter continued to lade from the picture,
strengthening the FASB's independence. 188 The AICPA lost its major-
ity of FAF seats when it emerged with live ()I' the sixteen trustees in
1993. 189 In the wake of Enron and SOX, the AICPA also left the busi-
ness of issuing authoritative accounting guidance for registered com-
panies. 19° Interestingly, in 2002, the FAF took the occasion of the ex-
ternal shock of scandal to change the FASB's voting rule back to the
178 See id. at 15. This enhanced independence from constituents but created a differ-
ent, more subtle public/private problem. For discussion, see Cunningham, supra note 31,
at 323-28. By '2002, the FASB earned $13.3 million from its publications as compared with
$3.9 million from contributions. N. at 325.
179
	
VAN RIPER, SUM note 16, at 107.
169 Id.
181
182 Id. The Emerging Issues Task Force (the 'Urn was restructured in 2003 with the
addition of two FASB Members to its agenda committee and a provision Ibr FASB ratifica-
tion of EITF consensus positions. See Lawrence W. Smith, The FASB's Efforts Thword Sim-
plification, FASB REP., Feb. '28, 2005, at 2, 2.
See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 126.
184 See id.
185 See id.
188 See id.
147 Id, at 164.
188 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 14-15.
189 Id.
190
 See Smith, supra note 182, at 2.
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four-to-three simple majority. 191
 In the post-Enron environment, the
need for speechonce again trumped the preparers' interest in agenda
control. 192
The FASB's final and most emphatic move to the public side of the
street occurred with the enactment of SOX in 2002. 193 SOX changed
the framework of federal recognition of GAAP, requiring that a recog-
nized standard setter be wholly funded by fees levied on reporting
companies by the federal government. 194
 The FASB duly applied for
recognition. 195
 Upon the SEC's approval of the application, the FASB
became publicly funded and ceased collecting contributions.m Tech-
nically speaking, it is no longer beholden to its constituents. 197
2. Empirical Studies
The FASB attracts a great deal of academic attention. Its trans-
parency and shifting voting rules, 198
 along with the allegations that it
has been captured,' 99
 make its proceedings an ideal subject for social
scientists armed with statistical methodologies. Studies have looked
for connections between the members' votes and prior affiliations,
and found nothing significant:2m Nor have any dominant voting coali-
tions of former auditors or preparers appeared,m although some two-
191 See FASB Voting Structure Streamlined, LEADER ' S EDGE, June 2002, at 3, 3.
192 See a
ail See Sarbaties-Oxley Act. of 2092, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of I I, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
lea lrl. § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Stipp. 111 2003).
195 Cun ningham, supra note 31. at 323.
of' See at. The FASB is much richer asn result. .See id. at 325. In 2004, federal support. fees
totaled $25.3 million and publication net revenues $13.05 million. See FIN. ACCOUNTING
FOUND., ANNUAL. REPORT 2005, at 35, 38 (2006), available at littp://wv,wfash.org/annualre
port/FAF_2005_AR.pdf.
197
 C111111 ingham, supra note 31, at 324.
198
 See VAN RIPER, .V//pra note 16, at 86-87.
199
 See Ti AccoUNTING ESTABLISIIMENT,	 note 10, at 1-2.
201) See John C. McEnroe & Stanley C. N4artens, An Analysis of the PASB's Independence, 1
AyouED Bus. Rits., Winter 1996/1997, at 129, 131-32 (concluding that the FASB's mem-
bers vote independently and updating an earlier study). Interestingly, a study of the APB
yields the KWIC result. See 0, Paul Newman, Coalition Formation in the APB and the FASI3:
Some Evidence ON the Size Principle, 56 Accr. REV. 897, 908 (1981).
201
	
e.g., Newman, supra note 200, at 897-98 (surveying the literature); 0. Paul
Newman, An Invesligation of the Distribution of Power in the APB and the FASB, 19 1 Accr. RES.
247, 261 (1981) [hereinafter Newman, Investigation of the Distribution r f Powerl (demonstrat-
ing that the observed influence of Big Eight representatives has been no greater than that
of non-Big Eight representatives).
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member voting pairs do show up in the data. 2°2 (Here a caveat must
be noted—any coalition activity respecting selection of agenda items
is unobservable. 2") The studies also have shown that the voting rules
matter: more standards get set under the 4-3 rule than under the 5-2
rule, with the supermajority significantly slowing the time to promul-
gation. 204 Filially, self-interest clearly motivates com menting compani-
es 205 and lobbying impacts the terms of the standards. 206 However, the
FASB has done fairly well with respect to resisting undue influence by
the large accounting firms. 207 In fact, one study has concluded that
the FASB has not been captured, at least in any empirically verifiable
sense. 2°8
202 See Sharon M. Moody & Dale L. Flesher, Analysis of FASB Noting Patterns . : Statement
Nos. 1-86, f J. Accr. Aunrrmc & FIN. 319, 328-29 (1986) (finding coalition evidence in
cases where the pronouncement passes by a 4-3 vote); Frank H. Selo) & Hugh D. Grove,
The Predictive Power of Voting Power Indices: FASB Voting on Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards Nos. 45-69, 21 j. ACCT. RES. 619, 622 (1983) (finding that one two•vote coalition
persisted, but that it did not wield voting power beyond that provided by its proper share
of the votes).
20S See Newman, Investigation of the Distribution of Power, supra note 201, at 249 (noting
that a powerful Big Eight coalition block could block agenda items so that an issue
reached the agenda only with the coalition divided).
204 See William R. Pasewark, The Effect of Imposed Voting Requirements on FASB Decisions, 15
J. Accr. AunaiNG & FIN. 75, 84 (2000) (showing that the FASB produced 3.80 pro-
nouncements per year under supermajority provisions and 6.78 per year under a simple
majority. rule). For simulations of voting patterns, see Thomas D. Fields & Ronald R. King,
Voting Rules for the FASB, l l J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 99, ill, 114 (1996) (showing that a
supermajority maintains the status quo more often given imperfect intOrmation but that
the margin of victory is unlikely to change under either requirement); R.R. King, An Ex-
perimental Investigation of Supermajority Voting Rules: Implications for the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 25 J. EcoN. Mum'. & ORG. 197, 206-15 (1994) (showing that a laboratory
experiment applying simple majority and supermajority voting rules reached inconclusive
results).
205 See Michael Etiredge et al., Competitive Harm and Companies' Positions on SPAS No.
131, 171 Acct. . Autirmr; & FIN. 93, 107 (2002) (showing positions motivated by interests
implicated by projected costs and potential competitive harm).
24/6 See Sally M. Schnitz. & Joan Hollister, Lobbying FASB on Accounting fir Investments, 19
J. Arruio Bus. RES. 85, 88-92 (2003) (showing the effect of the notice and connnent
process on SFAS No. 115).
207 See Paul R. Brown, A Dem-it/4/7)e A naiysis of Select Input Bases of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 19 J. Acct . . RES. 232, 233-45 (1981) (evaluating the relationship between
FASB decisions and constituent lobbying and yielding negative results, supporting the
hypothesis that the FASB does not consistently position itself with any one external con-
stituent).
208 See Hussein & Katz, tnpro note 17, at 61 (concluding that structural lactors, particu-
larly mutual resistance, constrain the competing constituents from dominating the FASB).
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D. Summary
Although the FASB's structure has been modified to assure more
public responsiveness, there has been no break with the classical in-
dependence mode1. 269
 Indeed, compared to the SEC, the FASB ar-
guably remains the more independent agency. The political branches
of the federal government state the mission and select the members
of the SEC. With the FASB, on the other hand, the political branches
only wield veto power—they can put it out of business or they (or
their SEC nominees) can selectively reject its output, but they other-
wise do not control it. 2111
 The FASB emerges in a position similar to
that of many public agencies: regulating within the parameters of
stated goals, remaining subject to loose oversight from political
higher-tips, and taking private preferences into account without per-
mitting them to determine results. 211
We have seen the FASB maintain apparent independence, deflect
a pluralist challenge to its legitimacy, survive, and prosper. It has done
all of this against a background of constant complaint. Critics have
accused the FASB of excessive delay, excessive complexity, and exces-
sive reliance on rules throughout its history. 212
 The question as to the
FASB's legitimacy accordingly remains to be answered.
11. DECISION USEFULNESS
This Part Focuses on the Conceptual Framework's designation of
the users as the interest to be served, a choice that had as much to do
with the creation of a viable agency framework as with the articulation
of a coherent accounting theory. 2 " For the New Deal model to work,
the FASB needed a focused goal. 214
 To get one, it broke with past ac-
counting theory to raise external transparency— "decision usefulness"
for the users—over internal control as the system's goal. 215
This has had three consequences. The first is substantive legiti-
macy, discussed in Section A. 216 The user tilt makes plausible the
FASB's claim to legitimacy as an independent expert. The goal of deci-
209 See VAN RIPER, supra note 10, at'
 ,86-87; Muudstock, 3/rpm note 29, al 818.
210 See VAN RtycH, supra note 10, at 9,14.
211 See Freeman, .111/na note 5, at 560.
212 See Bert:slim!, .vu/1r, ;tote 11, at 60-01,
213
 See FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, § 34.
214 See LANDIS, ,I/i/ga note 32, at 50-51.
215 See infra notes 225-249 and accompanying text.
216 See infra notes 219-265 and accompanying text.
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sion usefulness is generally accepted as a policy matter and makes sense
as a matter of economic theory. It aligns the FASB with information
economics, which affords the most cogent justification for a central-
ized, mandated standard setting For financial -reports. Section B ad-
dresses the second consequence: with decision usefulness, the Concep-
tual Framework embeds a normative preference for one of the FASB's
leading private constituents, users and markets, over the other, prepar-
ers and managers. 217 Although this caused constant and costly political
problems, it also yielded ancillary benefits. User support, or at least ac-
quiescence, counterbalances management opposition. At the same
time, no one can accuse the FASB of being a corporate tool. It instead
amounts to a subagent of its public agency government overseer ., the
SEC. Section C takes up this agency relationship. 218 The SEC's delega-
tion of standard-setting authority to the FASB for the most part has
served its own public purposes in a cost-effective manner.
A. The Conceptual Framework, Decision Usefulness, and Policy Legitimacy
The Conceptual Framework is widely regarded as a theoretical
failure, particularly with respect to the critical topic of revenue recog-
nition and measurement. 219 It did not silence critics who contend that
standard setting for financial reports implies a political choice be-
tween competing constituent interests. 22° Nor did it succeed in de-
termining the results of standard-setting exercises. 221 Actors at the
FASB defend it with faint praise as a useful exercise in philosophical
discipline 222 or a "relatively consistent body of standards" to which the
FASB "pay[s] attention." 223 And, to the extent that the Conceptual
Framework's precepts actually have shaped the FASB's standards, crit-
ics charge that they skew results toward formalism and artificiality and
sacrifice flexibility and responsiveness. 224
217 See infra notes 266-296 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 207-318 and accompanying text.
219 See Zeff, supra note 52, at 60.
220 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 10-11; Joshua Bonen & George Sorter, Reflections on
"Reflections on FASB's Conceptual Framework for Accounting and on Auditing, " 4 J.
Accr. AUDITING & FIN. 67, 69 (1989).
221 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 80.
222 Id.
223 Beresford, supia note I I, at 61.
224 See Homer Kripke, Reflections on the FASB's Conceptual Frameroutk for Accounting and on
Auditing, 4 J. Acct .. AunrriNG & FIN. 3, 49-50 (1989).
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I. Decision Usefulness
Some assert that the Conceptual Framework accomplished one
important thing, 225
 set out in a single unprepossessing sentence in
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1: "Financial report-
ing should provide information that is useful to present and potential
investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment,
credit, and similar decisions. "226
 This concept, known as "decision use-
fulness," seems like an obvious point, but it was controversial when
promulgated in 1978. 227
 Only thirty-seven percent of the comments
received on the point were favorable, and sixty-one percent of the
comments came from preparers. 228
The objecting preparers had their reasons for opposing the pro-
vision in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. I . 229
 Finan-
cial reporting in fact serves two purposes: it provides external trans-
parency and serves as a part of a rational system of internal manage-
ment. 230
 Historically, both purposes had been bound together under
the rubric of "stewardship, "231
 which emphasized the manager's duty
to maintain the value of assets in addition to its duty to report results
to owners and creditors. 232
 The value-maintaining preparer was seen
as a user and accorded an equal place at the table with owners and
creditors. 233
 Indeed, management asserted that stewardship implied
its own primacy, positing a community of interest between itself and
the firm's long-term shareholders as against an outside financial mar-
ket made up of speculators looking to turn quick profi B. 234
The Conceptual Framework, even as it paid lip service to the
stewardship concept, 235
 broke with history by removing management
from the group of recognized users. 236
 Although the Conceptual
Framework asserted that the "role of financial reporting requires it to
22r' J01111 C. Burton, A Commentary on the Reflections of Homer kripkr, 4 J. ACCT. AuDITING
FIN. 79,80 (1989).
226 FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, 34.
227 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16. at 20.
22H See id.
225
 See id.
2 :1° See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 158, at 296-97.
2" See id. at 296.
232 Id. al 295-97.
2" See id. al 296.
2" VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 21.
FASB, SFAC No. 1, supra note 36, §§ 50-53.
2511 Id. § 27; see also id. § 32 (asserting that standards that satisfy the objective of useful-
IICSS IO investors should be "useful to all who are interested in an enterprise's future capac-
ity to pay").
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provide evenhanded, neutral, or unbiased information," neutrality
concerned only the usefulness of information reported. 237 It had no
bearing on the relative treatment of constituent interests in the stan-
dard-setting process. 238 This posture, taken together with the Concep-
tual Framework's objectives of comparability across different prepar-
ers' reports and consistency across time within a preparer's reports,
implied significant constraints on management's discretion to choose
treatments (whether in view of a congenial bottom-line result or as
the result of an internal cost-benefit analysis), 239 Based on decision
usefulness, management would bear the burden of proof in justifying
its favored treatments in FASB proceedings. 240
For the FASB, decision usefulness meant more than a normative
choice between the markets and the preparers. It completed the pro-
ject of adopting the independent expertise model and foreclosing the
pluralist alternative. Recall that the expertise model only works if the
agency pursues an overriding goal. 241 If the goal remains contestable,
the agency ends up with the political task of accommodating conflict-
ing interests as it pursues multiple goals. 242 Decision usefulness, left
within the stewardship framework, would have cast the FASB into a
world of multiple users with varied and conflicting preferences. 243
The FASB's interest in maintaining its own independence foreclosed
the possibility of a neutral approach to constituent interests. 244
Unsurprisingly, the FASB has adhered to decision usefulness over
• time. Its actors believe that so doing keeps them above politics. 245 In
their view, the FASB exists to produce consistent standards with a con-
ceptual underpinning. 246 To take away the underpinning and open
the floor to all legitimate concerns would pull it away from its mis-
sion. 247 So far as the FASB is concerned, such an open-ended process
would be better undertaken by a public agency. 248
237 See id. § 33.
238 See id.
259 See id.
24 ') See Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 70, 77; see also King & Waymire, supra note 29,
at 591 (stressing the importance to the market of consistent treatment and consequent
constraints on management discretion).
S See LANDIS, supra note 32, at 50-51.
242 Stewart, supra note 104, at 1702.
243 See Ler, .supra note 157, at 2, 13.
244 See id.
243 See Beresfurd, supra note 11, at 61.
246 see id .
247 See
248 Id. at 57.
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Note that the FASB can proceed above politics and hew to the in-
dependent expert model only because it made a political decision ex
ante in its own Conceptual Framework. Unsurprisingly, staying above
politics pursuant to a political strategy has meant endless political prob-
lems, as the succeeding Sections show."9 At the same time, the institu-
tional benefits to the FASB have flu -
 exceeded the political costs.
2. Policy Legitimacy
The Conceptual Framework's embedding of decision usefulness
as the standard-setting goal, however useful as a matter of agency de-
sign, would have availed the FASB nothing had it not also imported
policy legitimacy. Fortunately for the FASB, it has done exactly that.
The preparers had more than historical precedent (and their
own self-interest) going for them in advocating the goal of steward-
ship. They also had a powerful economic argument, which put a cost-
benefit gloss on the pluralist, interest-balancing view of accounting
standard setting. 250 The argument stresses the costs of disclosure. 251
These include not only out-of-pocket compliance costs, but the poten-
tial for competitive disadvantage to the preparer and a wider discour-
agement of innovation and risk taking. 252 As to a particular proposed
standard, the more current the information reported, the more de-
tailed the report, the more focused on the profitability of a narrow
profit line, and the smaller the number of outside interests finding
the disclosure useful, the greater the likelihood that the disclosure
implies competitive disadvantage and would fail to pass cost-benefit
scrutiny. 253 Public values also come into play: because the requisite
cost-benefit judgments would necessarily be subjective, the legitimate
standard setter would have to arrive at a "fair and equitable" balanc-
ing of interests. 254 In this way, the preparers rolled together steward-
ship, pluralism, managerialism, and public welfare in a tidy package.
Based on decision usefulness, a two-part reply could be made for
the FASB. First, information is a public good that will be underpro-
249 See infra notes 266-296 and accompanying text.
250 See R.K. MAtrrz K WtLI,IAM G. MAY, FINANCIAL. DISCLOSURE IN A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY: CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 1-4
(1978) (presenting a project of the Financial Executives Research Foundation).
251 See id. at 1.
252 Id.
203 Id.
2" Id. at 4. It was argued that the FASIt should detail the costs and benefits of each
standard in an "economic impact statement." Id. at 7.
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vided absent regulation. 255 More particularly, the standards reduce
the social costs of information asymmetries, which include high trans-
action costs and thin capital markets with low liquidity. 256 Although
the capital markets certainly could function with low information,
they would not be robust. 257 With different investors having access to
different levels of information, the fact that information shows in-
creasing returns to scale implies that some investors would be en-
dowed with monopolistic returns and other, less well-endowed inves-
tors would withdraw from the market. 258 Bid-ask spreads would widen,
transaction costs would rise, and volume would drop. 259 The user-
based regime, in short, enhances allocative efficiency. 26°
Second, absent a centralized standard setter producing user-
directed and mandated GAAP, reporting would suffer from the struc-
tural imbalances that otherwise impair the corporate governance sys-
tem. 26 ' We have, after all, a situation of separated ownership and con-
trol. The users, as dispersed shareholders, have no incentive to pro-
duce standards. 262 Indeed, absent centralized standards, a free rider
problem would inhibit innovation by preparers and auditors and lead
to underinvestment in standards. 263 Finally, if the development of
treatments were remitted to the joint discretion of preparers and
auditors, management would have an advantage in getting rule inno-
vations to suit its interests, causing information asymmetries. 264
Taken together, the two justifications replicate those supporting
the federal mandatory disclosure system. The FASB could not ask for
a better defense than that,265 and could not have gotten by with any-
thing less. Note that at the same time the preparers' cost-benefit ar-
gument is countered without being confronted.
256 The Conceptual Framework takes care to note this. See FASB, SFAC No, 2, supra
note 103, § 135.
256 Lev, supra note 157, at 9.
257 See id. at 8-9.
298 Id. at 6-7.
259 Id. at 8.
269 See id. at 4-9.
261 See King & Waymire, supra note 29, at 594-06.
262 Id. at 595.
263 Id.
era
	 id. at 594-95.
265 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61 (pointing out that the United States has the
world's finest financial system).
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B. Management Opposition
Even as the FASB emerged as a plausible imitation of an exper-
tise-based, independent public agency, it differed in one significant
way. With a public agency, the elected legislature states the goal, im-
porting political as well as policy legitimacy at the outset. 266 With the
FASB, the founders delegated the goal-setting function to the agency
itself. 257
 The FASB then set the goal with a view to its own institutional
viability, while traversing the interests of a primary constituent. 268 Un-
surprisingly, the preparers dissented and the goal failed to attain a
general consensits. 269
 Dissent ripened into opposition when the FASB
proceeded to take seriously its own independence and set an aggres-
sive agenda of standards reform. 270
 The preparers had signed on dur-
ing the I970s, when the political environment made public standard
setting by actors hostile to corporate interests a cognizable possibil-
ity."' That threat receded after 1980, and with it management's dis-
position to cooperate with the FASB. 272
The FASB made enemies in boardrooms with a trio of initiatives
in the 1970s. First, it changed the rules on the recognition of loss con-
tingencies to block accruals before such time as the loss reasonably
could be estimated. 273
 This inhibited management's elbow room to
indulge in the time-honored practice of smoothing income across ac-
counting periods. 274
 Second, taking a fair value point of view that was
itself anathema to management, the FASB tightened the rules on
portfolio securities and troubled loans, forcing the banks to take
write-downs during a recessionary period. 276
 Third, the FASB went
after the oil and gas industry, which had been happily capitalizing and
266
 See LANDIS, St/pra note 32, at 50-51.
267 See VA N RIPER, supra note 16, at 77.
268 See id.
269 Id. at 75-76,78.
270 See id. at 119.
271 See id. at 9-10. The American Management Association had argued for a uniform
standard setter as early as 1932. Id. at 5. But in the hot stock market of the 1960s, managers
became inure appreciative of the benefits or flexible accounting. Zeff, supra note 52, at 58.
272
 See VAN RIPER, .%lipM note Ili, at 70,119.
279 Sec generally ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Slate/Dent of Fin. Accounting Stan-
dards No. 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Rd. 1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/
fas5.pdf.
271 See VAN RIPER, SUpianote 16, at 31.
275 See generally ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN MARKETABLE SEC., Statement of Fin. Ac-
counting Standards No. 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Rd. 1975), available at hup://wsm.
fasb.org/ Of/ fas12.pdf.
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amortizing all drilling costs. 276 The FASB wanted immediate and full
cost write-offs. 277 The industry argued that this would chill investment
in exploration and applied political pressure that eventually resulted
in an SEC limitation on the treatment's application. 278
The FASB continued to anger corporate boards in the 1980s,
when it. addressed corporate obligations to retired employees under
defined benefit pension plans. 279 The FASB wanted these hooked as
balance sheet liabilities. 280 The preparers resisted successfully, arguing
that such a treatment would mean the end of employee pension belle-
fits. 281
In the 1990s and 2000s, management stock options became the
next hot button issue when the FASB proposed that the options' eco-
nomic cost to the shareholders he assessed at fair value on the grant
date and expensed over the vesting period. 282 The preparers, again
arguing that the reform would inhibit investment and innovation, re-
sisted in Congress, procuring a Senate resolution grounded in their
pluralist, cost-benefit view of financial standard setting. 283 The FASB,
said the Senate, should confront the economic consequences of its
proposed standards. 284 A bill introduced contemporaneously would
276 See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING isv OIL AND GAS PRODUCING Cos.,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 19 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1977),
available at Imp://www.fasb.org/pdf/lits19.pdf.
277 See generally id.; see also generally SUSPENSION OE CERTAIN ACCOUNTING REquiRE-
MENTS FOR OIL AND GAS PRODUCING COS, (AN AMENDMENT w FASB STATEMENT No. 19),
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 25 (Fill. Accounting Standards Bd. 1979).
available at littp://wwwfash.org/pdf/ias25.pdf.
278 SRC VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 67-70; Robert T Sprouse, Discussion of the SEC's In-
fluence on Accounting Standards: The Power of the Veto, 19,J. A(7CT. RES. 165, 167 (1981) (ex-
plaining that the SEC's intervention was not technically a veto). The SEC cited national
policy concerns respecting the measurement of proven and probable reserves. See Adop-
tion of Requirements for Financial Accounting and Reporting Practices for Oil and Gas
Producing Activities, Exchange Act Release No, 33-5966, Public Utility Holding Company
Act Release No. 34-15108, Investment Company Act Release No. 35-20688, 15 SEC Docket
929 (Aug. 31, 1978).
275 See generally EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS, Statement Or Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 87 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1985) thereinafter FASB, SFAS No. 87J,
available at littp://wwwfasb.org/pdf/fas87.01; VAN MITI!, SliptZ/ note 16, at 118.
280 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 118. The FASB settled for a modification of the ex-
isting system. See generalli FASB, SFAS No. 87, supra note 279.
281 See. VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 118-22.
2g2 See id. at 155.
283 See. Michael H. Grano' & Stephen A. Zell; Unaccountable in Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2002, at A19.
284 See
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have conditioned the effectiveness of new standards on an SEC major-
ity vote. 285
 The FASB backed down and shelved the project. 286
The FASB, setting its agenda independently in this way, has pur-
sued decision usefulness in disregard of constituent opposition. The
preparers view this as a betrayal, a classic case of an unresponsive
agency promulgating regulations for their own sake. 287 Neither the
FASB notice and comment process nor the FASAC advisory process
has proved tractable for the preparers. 288
 They complain and get oc-
casional concessions, but the FASB continues to promulgate standards
that they oppose. 289
 The preparers, however, do not argue for a public
standard settet: 290
 They instead want to contain the private agency
with an agenda control mechanism: an oversight hoard with power to
block agenda items and force revision of existing standards. 29I They
have pressed for this at the FAF, 292 at the SEC, 293
 and in Congress, 294
making the pluralist case for public accountability without success.
Whether this implies a democratic deficit is another question. The
preparers hardly lack influence or political access. They have wielded
their political muscle to block proposed standards, secured two of the
FASB's seven seats, and, at least for a while, procured a supermajority
voting regime. 295
 Meanwhile, the FASB emerges From this four-decade
back-and-forth with an enviable reputation for independence. 298
C. Public Oversight
The relationship between a public agency and a delegated private
standard setter has been usefully described in private contractual terms:
285 Beresford, supra note 11, at 57.
288
 See Grano] . & Zell, supra note 283. The FASB famously returned to the matter in
2004, when the post-Enron political winds blew more favorably. See generally SHARE: BASED
PAYMENT (REVISED 2004), Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Account-
ing Standards Bd. 2004), available at hitp://www.fasb.org/pdf/1'as123r.pdf.
287
 See Beres	 supra note 11, at. 57 (citing complaints frtml Joint Reed, Chief Execu-
tive Officer of Citibank).
288 See VAN RIl'ER, supra note 16, at 99, 126; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60-61.
289 See VAN RIPER, .supra note 16, at 98,118-31,183.
29'9 See id. at 102; Beresford, supra note 11, at 59.
291 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 119-23,140; Beresford, supra note 11, at 57.
292 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 119-23 (describing the Business Roundtable's Ac-
counting Task Force); id. at 1211-27 (describing the preparer's argument for a return to
secrecy that would ease the path for back room logrolling).
26t Id. at 140 (recount- MO(31m Reed's proposal to David Ruder).
294
 Beresford, .supra note 11, at 57.
295
 VAN Rtiq:x, 314111a note 16, at 120,150,164.
298
 See Beresford, supra note 11, at 61.
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the public agency, like a firm, decides to "make or buy." 297 Buying
makes sense if the value of the resources conserved through reliance
on a private entity exceeds the relationship's ancillary costs. 298 The
costs mount if the delegate's incentives work at cross purposes with the
agency's pursuit of its public mission. 299 If the delegate has an advan-
tage of information and expertise and the agency's monitoring re-
sources are limited, then the agency can lose control of the outcome.")
The undermonitored delegate can hold up its public principal. 301
If we fill in the SEC as the principal and the FASB as the delegate,
the result provides an excellent example of a successful public-to-
private. contract. Two factors explain the success. The first stems from
the Conceptual Framework and decision usefulness. Together they
effectively align the FASB's institutional goal with the SEC's mission of
investor protection."2 Indeed, as between the two agencies, the FASB
now is the better-aligned of the two. Under the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, SEC ruletnaking now labors under
the same marching orders that the preparers once sought for the
FASB: the SEC is required to take "efficiency, competition, and capital
formation" into account in addition to investor protection. 9U 3
The alignment, thus set in theory, works in practice because the
FASB's appointments structure and rules of independence assure that
its members pursue its formal mission rather than constituent or per-
sonal interests. The alignment makes the SEC useful to the FASB, as
well as making the FASB useful to the SEC. To contain the FASB politi-
cally, the preparers must sustain the burden of an appeal to Congress,
as the SEC has proved an uncongenial lobbying alternative on repeated
occasions."4 The users, silently seconding the point, have remained
quiescent throughout the FASB's turbulent political history. 305
297 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DukE Li. 389, 390
(2003).
298 See id. at 405.
299 Id.
299 See id.
291 Id. at 406, 410-11 (citing the SEC's relationship with the FAS11 as an example).
"2 See FSAB, SFAC No. I, .itipm note 36, § 34; VAN R11 'ER, SUpra note 16, at 141.
293 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 106(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(b) (2000). For a case invalidating an SEC rule on this ground, see Chamber of Com-
meme v. SEC, 412 F.3(1133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
90.1 See VAN RIVER, supra note 16, at 140-46. John Reed, acting for a committee of pre-
parers on the agenda contrail initiative, unsuccessfully attempted to.inlittence both David
Ruder and Richard Breeden in succession, Id. A later SEC chair, Harvey Pitt, might have
been an exception, but was forced to resign before he got the chance.
" See id. at 98.
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The second factor in the success of the public-to-private contract
between the SEC and the FASB is shared expertise." Although the
SEC values the resources (both economic and political) 307
 saved by
outsourcing the standard-setting function, it nonetheless makes a sig-
nificant ongoing internal investment in accounting expertise."
Monitoring of the FASB's agenda, priorities, and emerging positions
by the SEC Office of the Chief Accountant occurs in the ordinary
course and proceeds cooperatively." The SEC's accountants and the
FASB announced a policy of mutual nonsurprise in 1974, and have
since held to it. 310
 As in all effective principal-agent relationships, the
principal also wields a big stick. 311
 The FASB's authority depends on
SEC certification, and because the SEC maintains its own standard-
setting capacity, it can overrule the FASB by taking a matter into its
own hands." It has done this rarely, however." The two most promi-
nent cases, the oil and gas drilling expense matter 3 " and accounting
for inflation," occurred during the FASB's early history, with con-
stituent pressure coming to bear both times. 316
 The most recent case
of note, accounting for derivatives, involved an extended back-and-
forth on a complex matter, with the FASB proving responsive over
time. 317
 In the more usual case, threats and suggestions suffice to
keep the two agencies' agendas and priorities in synchrony."
"' For a discussion of the SEC's role as an accounting standard setter, see generally
Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of Paeloli, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 837 (2005).
SeeMancistock,:mpra note 29, at 834.
" See Zeff, supra note 52, at 60-61, 63.
309 See id. at 60-61; see also SEC, Office of the Chief Accountant, http://www,sec.gosi
about/uffices/oca/ocaaccount.litin (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) (listing selected Staff Bulk-
tins issued by the Office).
310 See VAN RIPER, sepia note 16. at 26-27.
3" See Barrett, supra note 306, at 868.
312 See id.; Cunningham, supra IlMe 31, at 323.
313
 See Barrett, supra note 306, at 868.
30 SeeVAN RIPER, MIPra note 16, at 69-70.
313 See Zeff, supra note 52, at 59. incidences of overruling were more common with the
CAP and the APB. Id. at 58-59.
316 SeeVA RI PF,R, nippy, note 1(5, at 56-69; Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 74. In the
inflation accounting case, the auditors weighed in against the FASB. See Hussein & Katz,
supra note 17, at 74.
317 The SEC intervened with its own disclosure requirements between the promulga-
tion of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 119 and Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 133. See Proposed Amendments to Require Disclosure of Ac-
counting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7250,
Investment Company Act Release No. 34-36643, 60 SEC Docket 2575 (Dec. 28, 1995);
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm., SEC to Consider Requiring Disclosures About Deriva-
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D. Summary
The FASB and its founders sought to legitimate private standard
setting by adopting the New Deal model of the independent, expert
agency. Much like an independent public agency, they encountered a
range of pluralist, public interest objections to the FASB's exercises of
regulatory discretion. But faithful adherence to the New Deal play-
hook worked well in the long run. This happened in no small meas-
ure because the FASB put itself on history's winning side with decision
usefulness. It thereby aligned itself not only with the SEC, but also
with the broader economic shift away from managerialism and toward
capital market governance tinder the 11011T1 of shareholder value.
111. RULES AND PRINCIPLES
This Part addresses the standards themselves. We have seen that
the preparers' lack of agenda control triggers the charge of "stan-
dards overload." 319 The preparers also complain of excessive complex-
ity, but only when they dislike the substance of the treatment under
discussion. 320 Complexity bothers them less when the substance is con-
genial. 32 ' The complaint of excess complexity, as mooted more gen-
tives iind Market Risk ( Jan. 28, 1997), available at 1997 WI, 34093. See generally ACC.OUNTING
FOR DERIVATRrE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 133 (Fin. Accounting Standards Rd. 1998), available at http://www.fash ,org/
pdf/fas133.pdf; DISCLOSURE ABOUT DERIVATIVE FIN. INSTRUMENTS AND FAIR VALUE OF
FIN. INSTRUMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 119 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1994), available at littp://www.fasb.org/pdf/iiislw.pa
718 Fur theoretical treatments of the relationship, see Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki
Shibano, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board:
Regulation Through Veto-Based Delegation, 32 J. Acct. REs. 1, 2, 7-14 (1994) (setting out a
formal veto model showing that wider delegation by the SEC would enhance the effective-
ness of the process); D. Paul Newman, The SEC's Influence on Accounting Standwds: The Power
of the vew, 19 J. ACCT. RHs. 134, 143 (1981) (asserting that FASB voting rule changes in-
crease the relative power of the SEC); Joshua Rouen, Discussion of the SEC's Influence on
Accounting Standards: The Power of the %to, 19 J. ACCT. REs. 157, 158 (1981) (rejecting New-
man's conclusions).
319 See VAN RIPER, supra note I Ei, at 137; Beresford, supra note I I, at 60.
no See VAN RIPER, supra note Iii, at 110; fieresford, .supra note 11, at 60.
521 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 110; Beresford, supra note 11, at 60.
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erally, collapses into a third complaint: excessive use of rules. 322 To-
day, all sides call for "principles-based" standards. 323
Rules-based standards seek to supply a clear answer to every pos-
sible situation, pursuing the objective with detailed statements, bright-
line tests, and multiple exceptions. 324 Internal inconsistency often re-
sults. 325
 Comparability also suffers: reporting entities hewing to the
same strict standard appear comparable on the basis of their finan-
cials when their arrangements in fact are dissimilar. 326 Worse, say
GAAP's critics, the rules lead to transaction structuring and other
strategic behavior that undermines the quality of financial report-
ing. 327
 Financials that are manipulated in this way, although rule com-
pliant, do not truly and fairly state the reporting company's income
and financial position. 328
The latter complaint rang loudly in the wake of the Enron scan-
dal. According to critics, rules-based treatments had been manipu-
lated by users and auditors and had resulted in reporting misstate-
men tS. 329
 The rules had fostered a dysfunctional, check-the-box ap-
proach to compliance. 33" Preparers and auditors applied the rules
mechanically and ignored the substance of the transactions being re-
ported." The system had fostered a culture of noncompliance in
which regulated actors invested in schemes of rule evasion. 332 A prin-
ciples-based system, critics contended, would be less manipulable and
thus superior. 333 Congress concurred in passing SOX, which in-
structed the SEC to study the accounting system to ascertain the ex-
tent to which it is principles-based and to report on the length of time
522 See OFFICE or THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, STOnv PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D)
OF THE SARIIANES-OXLEY ACT or 2002 ON THE ADOPTIoN BY THE UNITED STATES FINAN-
CIAL. REPORTING SA•sTEM OP A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM § l.A (2003) [here-
inafter SEC limmed, available at http://www.sec.g-ov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand .
lion; Bercsford, supra note 11, al 60.
323 See VAN RIVER, supra note 16, at 192; &hipper, supra note 33. at 61.
324 SEC REPoRT, supra note 322, § 1.C.
325 Id.
9211
327 SChipper, supra note 33, at 68.
328 See SEC REvoRT, supra note 322, § 1,C; Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
329 See Steve ',lemma), SEC ACMUnting Cup's	 Playing by Rules May Not Ward Off
Fraud Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,2002, at CI,
"O See id.
331 See, e.g., The Lessons from Enron, supra note 39, at 9-10; Liemnan, supra note 329.
332 See lire Lessons from Errant, supra note 39, at 9-10; Liemnan, supra note 329.
333 See lire Lessons from Enron, supra note 39, at 10.
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needed to transition to a basis in principles.TM 4 The resulting SEC
Study confirms the relative superiority of principles-based over rules-
based accounting and, following the historical pattern, hands the job
of reconstructing GAAP back to the FASB. 3"
This Part enters a dissenting opinion. GAAP has indeed become
increasingly rules-based over time. 3" This is not because general prin-
ciples no longer influence particular standards—the Conceptual
Framework sets out general principles from which GAAP continues to
follow loosely—but because the FASB's constituents register demands
for tailored treatments and the FASB often responds favorably.TM7 The
pattern suggests capture, but also can be described as pluralist re-
sponsiveness. Either way, the substantive case against rules-based
GAAP is not compelling. 3" The FASB employs rules, despite their
shortcomings, because they constrain preparer discretion, facilitate
audits, and decrease the likelihood of scanclals.TMa These justifications
still carry persuasive weight.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages, Costs and Benefits
This Section explores in the abstract whether GAAP should be
articulated in rules or principles. To avoid the difficult problem of
clearly defining the difference between the two, it first describes the
dynamic that brings rules into existence. 340
Assume that the standard setter has proposed a new principles-
based standard. The preparers then use the notice and comment proc-
ess to seek particular exceptions from the general principles. One
means to this end is a "scope exception": a rule that excludes stated
transactions or items from a more general treatment category. 341
GAAP's complex derivative rules provide a good example, with nine
334 See Sarbanes-Oxicy Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108(d), 116 Stat. 745,768-69
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Stipp. III 2003)).
335 See SEC REPORT, supra note 322, § VI.
338 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 63.
337 See id. at 63,66-67.
338 See infra notes 371-442 and accompanying text.
339 See infra notes 349-360 and accompanying text.
5° The meaning of generally phrased principles to some extent lies in the eye of the
beholder. See Mark Kohlbeck & Terry Warlield, The Effects of Principles-Based Accounting
Standards on Accounting Quality 2 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
hup://ssrn.com/abstract= 724237) (defining principles-based accounting as emphasizing
asset and liability measurement, in particular fair value measurement, as opposed to earn-
ings-based accounting).
541 Schipper, supra note 33, at 66-67.
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exceptions to the definition of derivative, several of which came into
the rules solely For the purpose of reducing preparation costs. 342 Alter-
natively, preparers seek "treatment exceptions": special rules for de-
fined items or industry practices. 343 Revenue recognition rules that fa-
cilitate income smoothing provide a prominent example. 344 Having
won their rule-based exceptions, the preparers (and their auditors)
then request detailed instructions respecting implementation. 345
 The
FASB responds, and GAAP becomes still more complex.
1. The Case for Rules: Cost Savings, Compliance, and Transparency.
Rules-based accounting entails cost savings. 346 The cost savings
follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards
govern homogenous, recurrent situations where the actors need ex
ante instructions and have incentives to invest in compliance. 347 Such
conditions tend to justify a rules-based approach. 348 An across-the-
board shift to principles would make sense only if the costs of con-
stantly revising the rules to keep up with unintended applications due
to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage outweighed the benefits of
advance specification. 349 GAAP does not appear to lie anywhere near
that level of dysfunction. Under this analysis, the indicated course of
reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules'
operation, periodically adjusting categories so that reporting results
follow from the rules' operative principles. 35°
Compliance imports a second justification for rules. Detailed rules
provide roaclmaps both for GAAP compliance and the identification of
noncompliance. 351 The instructions provide a base of common as-
sumptions and knowledge for both preparers and auditors. 352 Differ-
ences in measurement decrease as a result. 353 Noncompliance becomes
342 14. at 66.
313 Id. at 66-67.
341 See M. at 67.
345 See id. at 66,
346 Cass R. Stinstein, I'robleun with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 972 (1995).
347 See 140111$ Kaplow, Rules Veaus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 570-
77 (1992).
346 See id. at 577.
319 See id.
350	 sunstein, supra noti! 346, at 995 (distinguishing underinclusion front overinau-
sion).
351 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
352
953 hi,
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more evident. 354 And, as verification becomes easier, the risk of audit
failure decreases. 355 Indeed, given a rule, the auditor who discovers
noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let the matter pass. 356 The
rule provides a justification for the refusal, minimizing potential dam-
age to the professional relationship between the auditor and the client.
Since the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it also increases the
ex post risk of SEC enforcement or civil liability respecting the preparer
and the auditor, further strengthening the auditor's resolve. 357
Transparency provides a third justification. Detailed rules en-
hance transparency because their precise instructions narrow the
room for differences of judgment. 358 To understand this connection
more clearly, revisit the legal realists' case for principles over rules
with respect to private law adjudication. 359 That case presupposes that
the law-to-fact application is explained and published in a judicial
opinion. The reported cases give the practitioner an expanding body
of fact-sensitive applications, ever better articulating the standard's
meaning. Over time, the accumulated case law offers the practitioners
a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rule book, even as the
principle's flexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thus the
substance of the legal regime) are open for public inspection. The
ongoing rules-based articulation of GAAP by the FASB works simi-
larly"' But the application of open-ended accounting principles by
preparers and auditors does not. Financial statements and footnotes
are very summary documents. Decision making about treatments
happens in a black box, evolving as a matter of practice amongst in-
siders. There is no comparable moment of transparency respecting
the law-to-fact application, thereby diminishing the chance for outside
evaluation. The law-to-fact applications, meanwhile, are not made by
judges empowered by the state. They come from the preparers—the
regulated actors themselves—acting with input from the auditor's
354 hi.
355 See id.
356 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 68.
357 See id. at 68-69.
356 See id. at 67-68.
359 See William W. Brawn, Berle and Mean.s Reconsidered at the Century Tarn, 261 CORP.
L. 737,746 (2001).
313° According to the FASB, any bias toward rules in contemporary GAAP stems from ex-
actly this sort of law-to-fact development process, as rules are rewritten to take into account
different transactional facts and interpretive opinions accumulate. FIN. Account -mt.: STAN-
DARDS Bu., PROPOSAL: PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH To U.S. STANDAR!) SET-rixo 3-4 (2002)
[hereinafter FASB, PRINCIPI.ES APPROACIli, available at http://www.fasb.org/proposals/
principles-hased_approach.pdf.
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professional review. And, when it comes to saying no, a professional,
even one historically conceived to be in an adversary posture to its
client, is in a materially different position from a judge.
2. The Case for Principles: Flexibility and Professional judgment
The case for principles arises in large measure from the descrip-
tion of the perverse effects of rules. The critics admit the force of the
case kw rules but assert that once rules come to dominate the ac-
counting regime, cumulative perverse effects cause disadvantages to
outweigh advantages. 361 The more detailed the set of exceptions, the
greater the chance that essentially similar transactions receive differ-
ent accounting treatments. 362 Scope and treatment exceptions build
inconsistencies into the standards, sacrificing the integrity of the un-
derlying principles. 363 Strategic behavior results as preparers seek to
exploit the inconsistencies, designing compliant transactions that sub-
vert the principles the rules supposedly effectuate. 3" Meanwhile, pro-
liferating exceptions fuel additional demand for explication from the
standard setter. 365 The responsive standard setter finds itself attempt-
ing to articulate a treatment for every conceivable scenario. 366 But the
attempt always fails, for the goal of a perfect, exhaustive rule book is
unattainable. 367
At this point, the case for principles reverses the case for rules.
Since the standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situa-
tions ex ante, it is not clear why exhaustive instructions should be
held out as a goal in the first place, given that micro-level standard
setting always results in inconsistencies. 368 The only party with all in-
formation concerning a given transaction is the reporting company
itself. It follows that its internal preparers, operating in good faith, are
more likely to derive an appropriate treatment when applying a prin-
ciple than is a rulemaking standard setter acting ex ante. With princi-
ples, company-specific knowledge and the regulatory framework in-
381 See SEC REpouT, supra note 322, §I.C; Sunstcht, supra note 346, at 1169-96.
362 SEC ItuyonT, supra nole. 322, §
588 See Sch ipper, supra note 33, at 66-67.
864 See SEC kti•otry, supra tune 322, § I.C.
365 See id.; Schipper, supra note 33, at 67.
866 SEC REPORT. supra note 322, §1.C.
367 Id,
368 See id.
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teract flexibly, and the regulation's purpose is more likely to be effec-
tuated. 369
3. Summary
These back-and-forth arguments hold out costs and benefits on
both sides. Rules narrow discretion and prevent the appearance of
first-best financial reports. Principles widen discretion, creating a
danger of corruption. 37° The answer to the question whether GAAP
should be articulated in rules or principles thus depends on the in-
quirer's further assumptions. If we hypothesize that preparers care
only about fidelity to accounting principles, and that audits proceed
in an ideal professional environment in which the auditor works un-
constrained by pressures of time, price, and reputation, then the case
for a principles-based regime is strong. But a plausible case for rules
can be stated even under such conditions. This case strengthens ma-
terially if we assume that concerns about the bottom line shape pre-
parer incentives along with an imperfect professional relationship be-
tween the auditor and the preparer client, an assumption widely held
in the present environment.
B. The Demand far Rules
Agents of the FASB vigorously defend rules-based GAAP. 371 Don-
ald Kirk, a founding member and one-time chair, once said that fair
presentation does not in the end mean fairness because preparers
always compete to find advantageous ways to apply principles-based
standards. 372 The FASB's agents also repeatedly cite constituent de-
mand. 373 In the FASB's view of the world, the same actor who argues
for principles one day turns around the next to demand detailed
"guidance" on a particular standard. 374 And even as the FASB publicly
embraces principles in the wake of demands registered after the En-
ron scandal, it simultaneously cautions that it does not entirely con-
trol the shape its standards take. 375 Rather, the standards are in-
formed by reading comment letters, meeting with preparer represen-
369 Id. § 1.D.
370 See AYRES & BRA IT FiF,WA	 s11/me note 4, at 56.
373 See VAN RIPER, supra note 16, at 81.
372 Id. at 81-82.
373 See id. at 105.
97.1 tri .
373 See Smith, .tupra note 182, at 3-4.
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tatives, and talking with auditors. 376 The FASB thus sees itself as a re-
sponsive regulator as it tends towards rules.
1. Auditors, Clients, and Plaintiffs
We have seen that preparers petition the FASB for scope and
treatment exceptions. 377 But the rules mostly proliferate due to the pe-
titions of auditors, which pull the standard setter into multitudinous
small issues. 378 Client relations motivate this in part. Auditors dislike
saying no because audit clients resist naysaying. Absent a precise written
justification, they balk at auditor objections to their treatments: "Show
me where it says I can't do this." 379 The auditor therefore seeks the
backing of a precise negative instruction in GAAP before objecting.ss°
The rule insulates the auditor's professional judgment from the client's
negative response and fixes blame on the external authority. Given a
rule, the auditor also can assure the client that competing firms will not
sign off on its financials either. 381
The audit profession's fear of enforcement entanglement, in par-
ticular civil liability, strengthens the preference.m With an open-
ended principle, both the preparer and the auditor must make a judg-
ment respecting a law-to-fact application. 383 Risk-averse actors in this
posture will be wary of second-guessing by regulatory authorities and
plaintiff's lawyers. 384  The good faith with which they apply the princi-
ple will be unverifiable ex post. Principles, then, make it hard to mini-
mize enforcement risk.
376
 Id. at 3.
m See Schippe•, supra note 33, at 67.
3.7f See BerestOrd, supra note 11, at 60.
S" SEC REPORT, supra note 322, § III.I.i.
3" See id.
38i See George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Biliwe and
After Enron, 52 Bunn'	 1325, 1335 (2003).
7K 2 See id. at 1331; Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 74; Mundstock, supra note 29, at
839. Note that the auditors' position changed over time: prior to the early 1970s, die pri-
mary conflicts that impacted accounting standards were between the preparers and the
users, with the auditors acting as neutral go-betweens. Hussein & Katz, supra note 17, at 74.
The mediative role ceased in the early 1970s due to growing worries about civil liability. Id.
Thereafter the auditors participated based on their own self-interest. hi.
585 See SEC REPouT, supra note 322, §
ss-1 See id.
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2. Secondary Capture
Rules often are said to evidence auditor rent seeking. If this is
true, then what the FASB describes as responsiveness to constituent
demands can be described as a species of capture.
The auditor rent extraction point follows from a public choice
description of perverse effects resulting from the enactment of the
federal securities laws. Before 1933, nothing required publicly traded
firms to undergo independent audits. 385 Nor were there any formally
designated, generally accepted accounting principles, much less a
standard setter. 388 The federal securities laws broke the pattern by re-
quiring an independent audit for registered companies. 387 This made
the large audit firms providers of a necessary professional service and
positioned them to collect rents. 388 Complex, rules-based standards
aid and abet the rent seeking. Complexity by itself generates work. 389
It also strengthens entry barriers: over time, fewer and fewer audit
firms possess the technical resources necessary for engagements with
large clients. 390 Indeed, the number of such firms has fallen to four. 391
Innovation, moreover, is choked off to the extent that it decreases
auditability and exposes the firms to legal risk. 392
•The account is persuasive as a structural matter: the auditors
have gatekeeping power and arc not invented to demand first-best
GAAP. But there are some qualifications. Audit firms engage. in price
competition despite their diminishing numbers. 393 The price of audit
services fell in the 1980s in the wake of the federal push for increased
competition in service provision by professionals. 394 Audit quality fell
383 See 'AN RIPER, supra note 16, at 6.
386 See id. at 5.
387 Id. at 6.
388 See Houston, supra note 381, at 1329-31.
389 See Charles R. Plott & Shyam Sunder, A Synthesis, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 227, 231 (1981):
see also Mundstock, supra note 29, at 817 (charging that the FASB's standards justify high
fees in exchange for little work and low legal risk and that its innovations never impair the
rent !low to auditors).
390 See Dale Buckmaster et al,, Measuring Lobbying Influence Using the. Financial Accounting
Standards Board Public Record, 201 EcoN. Sc Soc. MEASUREMENT 331, 340 (1994).
391 Shyam Sunder; Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing I8 (Yale Int:lett-. for
Fin., Working Paper No. 03-17, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abst •act_id=413581.
392 See Mundstock, supra nme 29, at 831. Advocates of expanded fair value accounting
are particularly likely to make this claim.
393 See Sunder, .supra note 391, at 18-20.
394 See id. at 20.
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with 4. 395 To see why, hypothesize the incentives of an audit partner
under pricing pressure. The audit process begins with an appraisal of
the client's risk of compliance failure. 396 The auditor's professional
judgment concerning the scope of the testing conducted during the
course of the audit follows from this risk appraisal. 397 The scope of the
testing in turn affects the audit fee—as the risk increases, more tests
are needed, more time must be spent, and the fee rises. In this sce-
nario, "check-the-box" rules recommend themselves over principles in
a hard cash sense because they make companies easier to audit. They
enhance verifiability, causing differences in measurement to decrease
and making noncompliance more evident. 398 The audit becomes
faster and more predictable, making it easier to state a price in ad-
vance and lock in a profit on the engagement. Contrast this rules-
based approach with a regime of principles requiring the preparer to
make fact-sensitive applications of the standards. This necessitates a
more labor-intensive audit in which unexpected and time-consuming
problems are more likely to arise. In sum, price competition for pro-
fessional services fuels the demand for rules.
At least one empirical study has examined the effects of audit
firm lobbying on the FASB's decision-making process. 399 The study
found that audit firms indeed comment on proposed rules from their
own perspectives rather than those of their clients:km) Moreover, the
F'ASB is more likely to change a rule in response to auditor, rather
than preparer, protest:101
 This result disappears, however, when alter-
native methodologies are used. 402 Nor does a statistical finding of re-
sponsiveness necessarily imply influence. The record may merely re-
flect the fact that preparers and auditors tend to comment on differ-
ent aspects of the same standards. 493 The preparers are more likely to
object to a standard's very existence or general purposes, matters
high on the FASB's substantive agenda; auditors comment on matters
395 Shyani Sunder, Minding our Manners: Accounting as Social Norms 5 (Vale Intl Cm for
Fin., Working Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at littp://ssrn.com/abstract=733743.
396
 R WIT% & BARRETT, SOW note 25, at 202-03.
397 M. at 204.
398 See St:hipper, supra note 33, at 68.
SeeJohn R. Haring, Jr., A crowning Rules and "The Accounting Establishment,"52 J. Bus.
507. 515 (1079) (concluding that the FASB is not responsive to business interests).
4°13 Id. at 511, 515.
401 Id. at 512, 515.
402 Buckmaster et al., supra note 390, at 341-42.
402 See id. at 340.
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of technical implementation that are less likely to implicate strong
preferences among the members. 404
3. Summary
intense demand for rules can be expected to persist and rent
seeking by the audit profession figures into the demand. That said,
auditor rents do not necessarily figure into the FASB's pattern of posi-
tive response. Rules can be justified independently on a principled
basis.
C. Rules and Scandals
The oft-voiced claim that rules-based GAAP caused recent ac-
counting scandals is largely unfounded. 405 This is not because GAAP
contains no manipulable rules; it does. Nor is this because the rules
have not been manipulated; they have been. Rather, it is because re-
cent corporate scandals and high-profile reporting failures for the
most part did not stem from rule manipulation.
Those who denounce GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a
number of subject matters. These core, rules-based regimes include
accounting for derivatives and hedging activity, leasing, real estate
sales, stock-based compensation arrangements, consolidation (or
other recognition) of related entity financial assets and liabilities, and,
prior to reforms instituted in 2002, 4°6 mergers and acquisitions. 497
The General Accounting Office's (the "GAO's") study of public com-
pany accounting restatements permits us to gauge the extent to which
these rules-based subjects figure into the spate of audit failures, ac-
counting restatements being the results of audit failures. 408 The study
shows that the annual number of restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to
225 in 2001. 409 From January 1997 to June 2002, the total number of
1" Id. at 340-42.
405 See Benston, supra note 381, at 1344-45 (blaming the Enron scandal in part on the
fact that GAAP has become increasingly rules-based).
Oar,
	
generally Bus. ComatNATtoNs, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 141
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2001), available at hup://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas141.pdf
(ending pooling treatment lOr mergers).
W7 SEC REPORT, supra note 322, §§I.C, tI.B.
14K See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-138, FINANCIAL. STATEMENT RE-
STATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING COAL
LENGES (2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], (wadable at Ititp://um-w.gao.gov/new.items/
t103138.pdf.
109 Id. at 14.
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restatements announced was 919. 410 These involved 845 companies,
amounting to 10% of all of those listed on public exchanges in the
United States. 4 " Issues involving revenue recognition, whether in re-
spect of misreported or nonreported revenue, made up the largest
group by subject matter category, accounting for almost 38% of the
919 restatements:112 The second largest group concerned cost- or ex-
pense-related issues, accounting for almost l6%. 4 ' 3 The GAAP reve-
nue and cost recognition standards bearing on this 54% majority
group are for the most part principles-based—they are phrased in
general terms and require significant exercises of judgment in their
application:114
The remaining restatements cover a range of subject matter,
some of it rules-based, but most of it principles-based. On the rules-
based side are restatements concerning merger and acquisition ac-
counting and derivatives. 415 Skewing toward the principles-based side
we find restatements involving in-process research and development,
related party transactions, loan-loss reserves and loan write-offs, asset
impairment, inventory valuation, and restructuring activity. 416
There is a simple reason why rules-based subject matters do not
dominate the list: rule compliance is more easily verified than princi-
ple compliance:117
 As we have seen, detailed rules hold out roadmaps
both to GAAP compliance and to the identification of GAAP non-
compliance:118 Observers who disapprove of the rules-based treat-
tio Id.
4 " Id. at 113 tbl.1.
412
 Id. at 19.
415 GAO REPORT, MOTU note 408, at 20. This group consists of instances of improper
cost recognition, tax issues, and other cost-related improprieties that led to financial mis-
statements. Id.
4 " See FIERWITZ & BARRETT, AliPril note 25, at 449-53. WorldCom is the most famous
recent case of the revenue and cost recognition principles' opportunistic misuse. For de
scription of this fraud, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarhanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Meio-
tic, Light Reform (and Itlust Might Work), 35 CON N. L. Rev. 915, 934-36 (2003).
615 See GAO REPORT, supra note 408, at 21 fig.3, 22 tb1.2. Derivatives are a growth item
on the list of restatements. See id. at 23. Along with other securities-related restatements,
they increased from 4.6% of restatements in 2001 to 12.4% of restatements in the first hall
of 2002. Id. But the category is capacious, and includes errors and misstatements involving
derivatives, warrants, stock options, and other convertible securities. Id. Some of the stan-
dards in question are rules-based, while others are standards-based. Significantly, most
involve fair value accounting.
41 " Id. at 21 fig.3, 22 thl.2.
117 Sre supra notes 351-357 and accompanying text.
415 See supra notes 351-357 and accompanying text,
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ments 419 dislike the reporting destinations to which the roadmaps
lead. Since these destinations tend to be favored by the preparers,
their managers happily comply with the rules. At the same time, a
noncomplying preparer is more likely to confront an uncooperative
auditor
There can be no denying that preparers often take advantage of
GAAP's rule structures when they design aggressive treatments. Regu-
latory arbitrage (the practice of structuring an inappropriate transac-
tion so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule) clearly is wide-
spread. But these aggressive rule manipulations, which tend to invoke
structured finance, leases, and (until recently) pooled mergers, do
not show up in large numbers on the list of recent restatements.
The audit failures and restatements follow less from regulatory
arbitrage than from strategic noncompliance—action taken based on
an interpretation of the law in conflict with the stated interpretation
of the regulator. 420 Neither rules nor standards prevent such conduct,
and, as between the two, rules have the advantage in deterring 4. 421
Meanwhile, in every restatement case, GAAP by definition has proved
adequate to the job of identifying the misstatement and providing
corrective instructions. Under this analysis, the drafters of SOX were
right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed to the
crisis, but wrong in ascribing the problem to the standard setter. This
is not for the most part a problem concerning the relative merits of
rules and principles in standard setting; it is a problem of compliance
and professional practice in a regulatory system made up of both.
419 See Mark W. Nelson et al., Where Do Companies Attempt Earnings Management,
anti When Do Auditors Prevent It? 2 (Oct. 22, 2000) (working paper, available at
intp://ssrn.com/abstract=248120) (showing that auditors pass on these treatments as
GAAP-compliant).
4" This was certainly the case with Enron. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark
Sale of Shareholder Value, 76 Tut.. L. REV. 1275, 1305-09, 1314-1320 (2002). it is true that
misleading accounting treatments of muisactions between Enron and off-balance-sheet
entities lie at the scandal's core, and that the applicable accounting standards are rules-
based. See id. at 1305-09. Indeed, the form-over-substance treatments of these rules are as
notoriously arbitrary as any in GAAP. lint, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the cen-
tral problem at Enron lay not with the rules themselves, but with the company's failure to
follow them. See id. at 1342. The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules' structural
shortcomings, but from the corruption or Enron's managers and perverse financial incen-
tives that inclined its auditor towards cooperation. Id. at 1305-09, 1314-20.
421 See supra notes 351-357 and accompanying text.
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D. The SEC Intervention
There is, then, no foundation for the proponents' belief that
principles by themselves solve compliance problems. The recent his-
tory of audit failure has been no respecter of principles. The case for
principles accordingly returns us to the auditor-client relationship to
inquire into preparers' incentives and the quality of auditors' profes-
sional judgments. If recent history is predictive, the prognosis is not
good. The preparers have been guided by short-term solicitude for
their own stock prices rather than by fidelity to accounting principles,
and the auditors have been disinclined to stop them. It will take more
than a new approach to standard setting to bring incentive compati-
bility to this context.
The SEC attempts to negotiate this problem in its report under
SOX by taking a split-the-difference approach that it calls "objectives-
oriented." 422 As an exemplar, it offers the FASB's recent revision of
the standard for mergers. 423 Here is the SEC's description of a princi-
ples-based system:
[T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard involves
a concise statement of substantive accounting principle
where the accounting objective has been incorporated as an
integral part of the standard and where few, if any, excep-
tions or internal inconsistencies are included in the stan-
dard. Further, such a standard should provide an appropri-
ate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of
the class of transactions or events and should be devoid of
bright-line tests. Finally, such a standard should be consistent
with, and derive from, a coherent conceptual framework of
financial reporting. 424
This takes a step back from the base case for principles. The princi-
ples-based approach relies on the preparer to make a good faith ap-
plication of the open standard to particular facts and assumes that a
successful system depends on exercises of professional judgment by
m SEC REPORT, supra note 322, § I.C. For additional comments on the SEC interven-
don, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Interpreting the Rhetoric of "Principles-Based" Sys-
tems in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting (2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). In Cunningham's view, the SEC's "objectives-oriented" stan-
dards are nothing more than GAAP's prevailing mix of rules and standards. Id.
(manuscript at 52-57).
123 SEC REPoRT, so/na note 322, §§ I.C, I.E.
'124 Id.§ I.C.
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auditors and preparers who are motivated by fidelity to the goal of fair
representation. 425 The SEC removes this stress on the regulated ac-
tors' responsibility for law-to-fact determinations by endorsing the le-
gitimacy of constituent demands for specificity. 426 It then shifts a bur-
den of specificity back to the standard setter to provide "an appropri-
ate amount of implementation guidance."427 Bald statements of
principles, says the SEC, provide preparers and auditors insufficient
structure in which to frame their professional judgment. 428 The "prin-
ciples" need to be "defined specifically. "429
The SEC does not entirely abandon the objectives of principles-
based standards, however. 430 Its projected regime appears to hold out
the benefit of a decrease in the level of reporting detail. 43 ' At the
same time, comparability of treatment across different issuers would
be enhanced through the avoidance of scope and treatment excep-
tions. 432 But the decrease in complexity implies a concomitant loss of
transparency, since commonality of treatment obscures particulars in
the economics of differing underlying transactions. 433 Relevance, reli-
ability, and comparability become matters to be traded off by the
standard setter in a balancing exercise. 134 At the bottom line, says the
SEC, economic substance should drive the development and scope of
the standards. 435
Although this sounds plausible, a question must be asked: Flow
does the regime envisaged simultaneously articulate precise instruc-
tions and eschew all exceptions from its categories? So doing would
amount to a considerable achievement. The drawing of lines is intrin-
sic to regulation. Line drawing is what case law under principles is
supposed to do. It is not at all clear that financial reporting standards
425 See Schipper, supra note 33, at 61; see also Accounting Reform and investor Protection:
Heating Before the S. Comm. on Banking, HMO. and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 148-49 (2002)
(prepared statement of Sir David Tweedie, Chairman, International Accounting Standards
Board) (describing the European system); Mundstock, supra note 29, at 844 (suggesting
that principles-based standards will be favored by preparers),
126 See SEC Rerowr, supra note 322, § I.C.
427 Id.
425 Id.
425 Id.
4" See id. § IV.D.
451 See SEC REPORT, Supra note 322, § IV.!).
452 See id. §§ LC, MD.
455 The comments itt the text draw on FASR, PRINCIPLES APPROACII, SUP! note 360, at
7.
454 See SEC RE.PouT, .supra note 322, §
445 Id.
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differ from any other body of regulation in this regard. So, to the ex-
tent that the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all standards
mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disap-
pointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any
other regulatory context. 4•€
The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards
that. incorporate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the
rubric of principles-based accounting. The system envisioned more
accurately would be characterized as one of tough, general rules. 437
Such a regime would have advantages. For example, it presumably
would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments tolerated in re-
cent years, particularly those facilitating income smoothing. But if this
is what the SEC has in mind, another question arises: In the present
political and institutional context, how likely is it that the preparers,
their auditors, and their friends in Washington would permit the
FASB to use the rubric of principles-based accounting to usher in a
new era of strict treatments? Looking at the four-decade history sur-
veyed above, the answer must be: very unlikely.
As a practical matter, then, if the SEC is serious about this move
to principles, then preparer and auditor judgments will matter more
in the future. The SEC acknowledges this when it warns that princi-
ples-based accounting implicates a more expensive, time-consuming
audit process. 438 It anticipates that, in order to review preparer judg-
ments, audit Firms will have to hire expensive personnel with exper-
tise in complex transactions. 439 It also anticipates that the system will
require active audit committee oversight and other strong enforce-
ment agents. 44" Finally, it advises auditors and preparers to generate
extensive paper records respecting treatment decisions, so as to posi-
tion themselves to defend their good faith. 441 We get principles, then,
but no reliance on those applying them.
At the bottom line, the SEC is asking the users to trust that the
creation of the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
436 See FASB, PRINCIPLES A]'PROACH, supra note 360, at 6-
437 The FASB's 2002 proposal in effect warns audit firms and issuers of this when it
points out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earnings figures. See id. at
7-8.
43" See SEC REPORT, supra note 322, §§ I.C, I.1, VII
439 see id. §1 . 1 .
44D Id. §
441 1,./.
2007]	 A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards. Board	 53
(the "PCAOB") 442 effects a shift to a robust compliance regime. The
question is whether this better, more principles-based world can be
realized without unintended negative effects due to poor professional
judgment.
E. Sum ma ry
The public-private distinction helps to explain the connection
between the standards' form and the audit process. The FASB, by con-
joining agency independence and substantive alignment with the user
interest, traverses the interests of a key constituent: corporate man-
agement. This has a negative consequence. For the self-regulatory re-
porting system to work well, management must internalize the spirit
of the standards and cooperate fully with the audit firms. It has done
neither, and the standards' form has been skewed as a result. No one,
however, suggests the corrective of reconstituting the standard setter
along pluralist lines. We have instead chosen to regulate the auditors.
The PCAOB has the job of ameliorating the cooperation problem by
forcing the audit firms to reject aggressive preparer treatments. if the
PCAOB succeeds at this, then, and only then, will the FASB be free to
move toward principles.
CONCLUSION
The FASB's variant on the New Deal agency model remains ro-
bust. Privately constituted, but now publicly funded, the FASB is more
independent than ever. It may be second best, but nobody seems able
to suggest something better. Public interest advocates would remove
financial standard setting to a government agency. That would suc-
ceed in getting a new hearing for substantive views that have not
found favor at the FASB. But it is by no means clear that better stan-
dards would result. Public choice theorists propose the more radical
alternative of deregulating GAAP by leaving the development of stan-
dards to preparers and auditors operating in spontaneous order. But
turning back the clock to 1929 presents significant risks and therefore
has little practical appeal.
442 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §'103(c), 15 U.S.C. 7213(c) (Stapp. 111 2003). Under
SOX, the PCAOB is not a U.S. government agency, but a private organization with a gov-
ernmental mandate. Id. § 101(b). For the view that the PCAOB should he considered a
U.S. government agency for due process purposes, see generally Dolma M. Nagy, Playing
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Pubic/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 975 (2005).
